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AIDS DISCRIMINATION UNDER FEDERAL, STATE, AND
LOCAL LAW AFTER ARLINE
ROBERT P. WASSON, JR.*
In School Board v. Arline, the United States Supreme Court de-
termined that people who suffer from tuberculosis can be pro-
tected from employment discrimination by the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973. Arline is certain to affect people afflicted with
AIDS-related disorders who suffer discrimination. In this Arti-
cle, Professor Wasson examines the Arline decision and the ef-
fect it will have on AIDS-related discrimination. Also, he exam-
ines provisions of the United States Constitution, acts of
Congress, state law, and municipal ordinances, all of which
might provide alternative measures of protection for those who
suffer AIDS-related discrimination.
T HIS PAST term the United States Supreme Court decided
School Board v. Arline.1 In Arline, a public elementary school
teacher was fired from her job following her third relapse of tuber-
culosis,2 a contagious, infectious, communicable disease. She sued
for reinstatement and back pay under the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 (hereafter "the Act"), the major enactment of Congress to ad-
dress handicap discrimination.' The Court held that a person af-
flicted with tuberculosis was a "handicapped individual" within
the meaning of the Act." It said that although Mrs. Arline was a
"handicapped individual," it was necessary to consider whether
she was "otherwise qualified" within the meaning of the Act, de-
spite her contagious disease, so that she could be reinstated to her
position.5 Further, the Court said that to determine whether Mrs.
Arline was "otherwise qualified," the trial court, on remand, would
have to base its decision on medical factors and scientific knowl-
edge.' The Court concluded "that the fact that a person with a
record of physical impairment is also contagious does not suffice to
* Assistant Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. B.A., 1976, Harvard Col-
lege; J.D., 1979, Harvard Law School. The author expresses his sincere appreciation for the
research assistance provided by Ms. Mary Bowe, and to Ms. Joan Dang and Ms. Phyllis
Parham for preparing the manuscript.
1. 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
2. Id. at 1125.
3. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 357 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96 (1982)).
4. 107 S. Ct. at 1127.
5. Id. at 1130-31.
6. Id. at 1131.
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remove that person from coverage under [the Act]." 7 However, be-
cause the Court in Arline specifically declined to address the im-
pact of its decision on people who carry contagious diseases, such
as Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), but without
manifesting symptoms,8 it is necessary to examine both the nature
of AIDS-related disorders and the Act to determine the extent to
which Arline should help people with AIDS-related disorders fight
discrimination.
In this Article the author begins by distinguishing people with
AIDS from people with AIDS-relatd complex, and from people
who have been merely exposed to the AIDS virus. He then ana-
lyzes relevant provisions of the Act and applies it to each of the
three groups of people with AIDS-related disorders. The author
suggests that the Act, fairly read, generally would protect from dis-
crimination people with AIDS-related disorders. The author then
highlights actual cases of discrimination against people with AIDS-
related disorders to underscore the need for remedial action. Then,
the author examines the Arline case, concluding that the Court's
express refusal to apply its analysis to carriers of contagious dis-
eases such as AIDS makes the application of Arline problematic
and demonstrates the need to consider other federal statutes, con-
stitutional provisions and state and local remedies as alternative
theories of recovery.
I. THE NATURE OF AIDS-RELATED DISORDERS
The cause of AIDS9 is a retrovirus,10 formerly identified as the
human T-cell lymphotropic virus type III (HTLV-III) or as
7. Id. at 1130.
8. Id. at 1128 n.7.
9. The term "acquired" refers to the fact that the disorder is neither inherited nor ex-
plained by an underlying illness. The term "immune deficiency" refers to the fact common
to all who suffer from the disorder, that is, an inability of the body to defend itself from
foreign agents and infections. The term "syndrome" refers to the fact that persons with the
disorder are subject to one or more specific diseases as a result of the body's weakened
immune system. See generally FLORIDA DEP'T OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES,
PAMPHLET ON AIDS, HRSP 150-3 (Sept. 1, 1985) at 2; Leonard, Employment Discrimina-
tion Against Persons with AIDS, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 681, 684 (1985).
10. Retroviruses are distinguished from other viruses by their chromosome structure and
mode of replication. See Laurence, The Immune System in AIDS, Sc. AM., Dec. 1985, at 88;
NIH Conference-The Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: An Update, 102 ANNALS IN-
TERNAL MED. 800, 807 (1985) [hereinafter NIH Conference]; Memorandum from Assistant
Attorney General Cooper on Application of Section 504 of Rehabilitation Act to Persons
with AIDS, reported in [May-June] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 122, at D-2 n.8 (June 25,
1986) [hereinafter DOJ Memorandum] (on file, Florida State University Law Review).
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lymphadenopathy-associated virus (LAV). By international agree-
ment, medical scientists now refer to it as HIV." The virus inhib-
its the body's ability to resist diseases by infecting white blood
cells, called T-lymphocytes, which are an integral part of the
human immune system.12 As a result, the immune systems of these
patients are "characterized by functional defects in virtually all
limbs of the immune system."1 3 Due to these defects in the im-
mune system, people with AIDS are vulnerable to a variety of op-
portunistic infections and malignant conditions that generally do
not afflict people without AIDS. These defects in the immune sys-
tem lead to a progressive weakening of the patient, and eventually
resulting in death."
The major routes of transmission of HIV infection are through
blood, blood products, and semen."5 This is evinced by the groups
11. NIH Conference, supra note 10, at 800 & 806. In May 1984, American reseachers
reported identifying the AIDS virus as a member of a family of viruses known as human T-
lymphotropic retroviruses, or HTLV. See Gallo, Salahuddin, Popovic, Shearer, Kaplan,
Haynes, Palker, Redfield, Oleske, Safar, White, Foster and Markham, Isolation of
Cytopathic Retroviruses (HTLV-III) from Patients with AIDS and at Risk for AIDS, 224
Sci. 500 (1984). Somewhat earlier, French reseachers isolated from AIDS patients a
lymphadenopathy virus, designated LAV. See Barre-Sinoussi, Chermann, Rey, Nugeyre,
Chamaret, Gruest, Dauguet, Axler-Blin, Vezinet-Brun, Rouzioux, Rozenbaum &
Montagnier, Isolation of a T-Lymphotrophic Retrovirus from a Patient at Risk for Ac-
quired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 220 Sci. 868 (1983). See generally Council Report:
The Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), 252 J.A.M.A. 2037, 2038 (1984) [here-
inafter Council Report]. The designation "human immunodeficiency virus" (HIV) has been
accepted by a subcommittee of the International Committee for the Taxonomy of viruses as
the appropriate name for the retrovirus. Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syn-
drome-United States, 35 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY
REPORT (MMWR) 758 (Dec. 12, 1986). More recently, reseachers identified a third agent
called AIDS-related virus, or ARV, which is also fundamentally the same as the other two
viruses. Osborn, The AIDS Epidemic: An Overview of the Science, 2 ISSUES Sci. & TECH. 40,
48 (Winter 1986).
12. DOJ Memorandum, supra note 10, at D-2.
13. NIH Conference, supra note 10, at 809. See also Lane, Depper, Greene, Whalen,
Waldmann & Fauci, Qualitative Analysis of Immune Function in Patients with the Ac-
quired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 79, 82 (1985).
14. See Pear, States AIDS Discrimination Laws Reject Justice Department's Stand,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1986, at A20, col. 1 ("No one has been known to recover from AIDS");
Altman, 40,000 AIDS Cases Seen in City by '91, N.Y. Times, July 31, 1986, at A13, col. 1
("There is no effective treatment for AIDS, which destroys the body's [immunity system]
and eventually proves fatal."). See also NIH Conference, supra note 10, at 802 ("No patient
who has unequivocal acquired immunodeficiency syndrome has yet been cured of this inva-
riably fatal disease."); Council Report, supra note 11, at 2041 ("At present, there are no
cases of AIDS in which the immune system has been reported to have recovered.").
15. Friedland, Saltzman, Rogers, Kahl, Lesser, Mayers & Klein, Lack of Transmission of
HTL V-III/LA V Infection to Household Contacts of Patients with AIDS or AIDS-Related
Complex with Oral Candidiasis, 314 N. ENc. J. MED. 344 (1986) ("HTLV-III/LAV has been
isolated from peripheral blood in both symptomatic and asymptomatic cases of infections.
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in the United States that are at an increased risk of infection with
the virus. The high risk groups include homosexual and bisexual
men with multiple sexual partners; intravenous drug abusers
among whom sharing of needles is common; recipients of transfu-
sions of blood and blood products; hemophiliacs; sexual partners of
those in the foregoing groups; and children born to mothers who
have AIDS.' The government estimates that 1 million - 1.5 million
Transmission also appears to occur by means of intimate sexual contact, both homosexual
and heterosexual, and the virus has been isolated from semen.") (footnotes omitted); Rec-
ommendations for Preventing Transmission of Infection with Human T-Lymphotropic Vi-
rus Type III/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus in the Workplace, 34 MMWR 682 (1985)
[hereinafter Workplace Recommendations] ("HTLV-III/LAV is transmitted through sexual
contact, parenteral exposure to infected blood or blood components, and perinatal transmis-
sion from mother to neonate."); Resnick, Veren, Salahuddin, Tondreau & Markham, Stabil-
ity and Inactivation of HTL V-III/LA V Under Clinical and Laboratory Environments, 255
J.A.M.A. 1887 (1986) ("The HTLV-III/LAV is transmitted primarily by sexual contact and
through blood or blood products in vivo ...."). See also Heterosexual Transmission of
Human T-lymphotropic Virus Type III/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus, 34 MMWR
561, 562 (Sept. 20, 1985) [hereinafter Heterosexual Transmission] (suggesting that female-
to-male transmission of HTLV-III/LAV (HIV) may be less efficient than male-to-male
transmission and that the relatively small proportion of women among infected persons
might account for the small number of cases of heterosexual transmission of AIDS); Altman,
40,000 AIDS Cases Seen in City by '91, N.Y. Times, July 31, 1986, at A13, col. 2 ("a contin-
uing study at Montefore Hospital . . .showed that 63 percent of steady heterosexual part-
ners of individuals who had AIDS or an associated condiditon called AIDS-related complex
remained free of infection with the AIDS virus").
16. With respect to homosexual and bisexual men with multiple sexual partners, see Up-
date: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-United States, 35 MMWR 17, 18 (1986)
[hereinafter Update] ("A total of ... (94%) [of] AIDS patients can be placed in groups that
suggest a possible means of disease acquisition: men with homosexual or bisexual orienta-
tion who have histories of using intravenous (IV) drugs (8"1 of cases); homosexual or bisex-
ual men who are not known IV users (65%); heterosexual IV drug users (17 "1); persons with
hemophilia (1%); heterosexual sex partners of persons with AIDS or at risk for AIDS (1 ,);
and recipients of transfused blood or blood components (2%). The remaining... [6%] have
not been classified by recognized risk factors for AIDS."). See also Friedland, supra note 15,
at 344; Workplace Recommendations, supra note 15, at 682; Sande, Transmission of AIDS:
The Case against Casual Contagion, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 380 (1986) ("[Tlhe disease has
remained confined largely to the high-risk groups (homosexual men, intravenous drug users,
patients with hemophilia and persons who received transfusions before blood screening was
introduced, and the offspring and sexual partners of members of these groups), and the
distribution of cases among these groups has been remarkably constant throughout the epi-
demic. In only 5 percent of [the] cases is the mode of transmission unknown. Thus, there is
no evidence that the disease is spreading to other populations."). But, recent data indicate
that it is increasingly inaccurate to stereotype people with AIDS as gay white males because
of: (1) the sharing of hypodermic needles among intravenous drug users; (2) greater suscep-
tibibility among blacks and Hispanics; and (3) an increasing amount of heterosexual trans-
mission among those groups. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1987, at A26 col. 1 ("White
homosexual men still make up the largest share-49 percent-of the nation's diagnosed
AIDS cases as of July 20, [1987]. But blacks and Hispanic people make up 39 percent of all
cases, even though they account for only 17 percent of the nation's total adult polulation.").
With respect to intravenous drug abusers who share needles, see Update, supra, at 18;
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people have been exposed to the HIV virus in the United States.17
Of the 38,000 people who have been diagnosed as having AIDS,
more than 21,000 have died,18 and an estimated 1,000 - 1,200 new
cases of AIDS are diagnosed each month.1 9 Indeed, it is estimated
that by the end of 1991, 179,000 to 270,000 Americans will have
died of AIDS."0
The United States Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has estab-
lished three conditions that must be met before it will recognize a
person who has been diagnosed with AIDS as actually having the
disorder.21 These conditions are: (1) the presence of one or more
opportunistic diseases that are at least moderately indicative of an
underlying immunodeficiency; (2) the absence of all known under-
lying causes for that deficiency other than HIV infection; and (3)
the absence of all other known causes for reduced resistance to op-
portunistic diseases other than HIV infection.22 One must meet
Friedland, supra note 15, at 344; Sande, supra, at 380; and Heterosexual Transmission,
supra note 15, at 561. With respect to recipients of blood and blood products, see Update,
supra at 18; Friedland, supra note 15, at 344; Sande, supra at 380; and Heterosexual Trans-
mission, supra note 15, at 561. With respect to hemophiliacs, see Update, supra at 18;
Friedland, supra note 15, at 344; Sande, supra, at 380; and Heterosexual Transmission,
supra note 15, at 561. With respect to sexual partners of those in "high risk" groups, see
Update, supra, at 18; Friedland, supra note 15, at 344; Sande, supra, at 380; and Heterosex-
ual Transmission, supra note 15, at 561. And, with respect to children born to mothers who
have AIDS, see Update, supra,, at 18; Friedland, supra note 15, at 344; Sande, supra, at 380;
and Heterosexual Transmission, supra note 15, at 561.
17. Pear, States' AIDS Discrimination Laws Reject Justice Department's Stand, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 17, 1986, at A20, col. 1 ("The Government says that a million to 1.5 million
people have already been infected with the AIDS virus .... ").
18. Reagan Names New York Cardinal, Homosexual Doctor to AIDS Panel, 2 AIDS
Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 14, at 3 (July 29, 1987) ("As of July 13, 1987, 38,312 cases of AIDS
have been diagnosed in the U.S., with 21,720 deaths, according to the Centers for Disease
Control.").
19. Sullivan, City Data Show Rise in AIDS is Leveling Of, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1986,
at B1, col. 1 (Officials from the National Centers for Disease Control said "the agency was
reporting about 1,000 to 1,200 new cases each month.").
20. Pear, States' AIDS Discrimination Laws Reject Justice Department's Stand, N.Y.
Times, Sept 17, 1986, at A20, col. 1 ("The Government says.., that there will be a total of
270,000 cases [of AIDS] by the end of 1991."); Boffey, Federal Efforts on AIDS Criticized
as Gravely Weak, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1986, at A18, col. 1 ("AIDS will continue to spread
rapidly in the United States, with the cumulative death toll rising to more than 179,000 by
the end of 1991 .... 'Beginning in 1990,' warned Dr. Frank Press, president of the [Na-
tional] Academy [of Sciences], 'we will lose as many Americans each year to AIDS as we lost
in the entire Vietnam War.' About 58,00 Americans died in that war.").
21. The Case Definition of AIDS Used by CDC for National Reporting, (CDC-REPORTA-
BLE AIDS), UNITED STATES CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, August 1, 1985 [hereinafter
CDC-REPORTABLE AIDS] (on file, Florida State University Law Review).
22. See id. at 1-2 for a list of diseases at least moderately indicative of underlying cellu-
lar immunodeficiency. See also id. at 3, where the CDC identifies diseases considered indica-
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each of these three criteria to be classified by the CDC as a person
with AIDS.
In addition to these criteria, a person is not regarded by the
CDC as a person with AIDS unless he or she tests "seropositive" or
HIV positive.2 3 However, the CDC's definition is so restrictive that
even when a person who tests seropositive displays a number of
symptoms characteristic of the disease, he or she will not satisfy
the CDC's definition of a person with AIDS absent affliction with
one or more of the opportunistic diseases that take advantage of
the suppressed immune system.2 4 Furthermore, even where a per-
son is so afflicted, he or she still will not satisfy the CDC's defini-
tion absent manifestation of a number of symptoms characteristic
of the disease.25
Because the CDC's definition of AIDS cases is so restrictive,
there exists a second group of people with AIDS-related disorders
whose members do not meet the criteria for CDC-defined AIDS,
but who manifest some-but not all-of the symptoms of AIDS.
People in this group are said to have AIDS-related complex, or
ARC.2 6 Formerly called pre-AIDS, 7 ARC has no uniform defini-
tive of AIDS, even where the opportunistic diseases are not present, if the patient has tested
positive for HIV.
23. Id. at 1. Seropositive refers to a patient who is generating antibodies to the AIDS
virus. See Provisional Public Health Service Inter-Agency Recommendations for Screening
Donated Blood and Plasma for Antibody to the Virus Causing Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome, 34 MMWR 1 (1985) [hereinafter Screening Recommendations]. A single positive
test for antibodies is of course not conclusive as to infection with the virus because of the
possibility of a "false positive" response. See also Workplace Recommendations, supra note
15, at 691. Nevertheless,
[a] single negative test for HTLV-III/LAV may be applied . .. if it is an antibody
test by ELISA, immunofluorescent, or Western Blot methods, because such tests
are very sensitive. Viral cultures are less sensitive but more specific, and so may
be relied on if positive but not negative. If multiple antibody tests have inconsis-
tent results, the result applied to the case definition should be that of the major-
ity. A positive culture, however, would overrule negative antibody tests.
CDC-REPORTABLE AIDS, supra note 21, at 1.
24. See Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS)-United States, 32
MMWR 389 (1983). See also Friedland, supra note 15, at 344 (utilizing the CDC definition).
25. CDC-REPORTABLE AIDS, supra note 21.
26. See DOJ Memorandum, supra note 10, at D-3. See also NIH Conference, supra note
10, at 801 (Among some of the symptoms associated with ARC are: "generalized lymphade-
nopathy, unintentional weight loss, fever, chronic diarrhea, malaise and lethargy,
lymphopenia, leukopenia, anemia, idiopathic thrombocytopenia, immunologic abnormalities
characteristic of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, and oral thrush."). But see Fried-
land, supra note 15, at 344 (defining ARC in adult patients as "the presence of (1) unex-
plained generalized lymphadenopathy ... or unexplained oral candidiasis . . . and (2) two
laboratory abnormalities-a low aboslute number of helper T cells and a low T-helper/T-
suppressor ... ratio").
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tion,2 8 and the term has not been formally endorsed by the CDC.2 9
The medical prognosis for people with ARC is unknown. "Current
literature suggests that between ten and thirty percent of those
with ARC will develop AIDS. 30
The third and final group of people who test seropositive with
AIDS-related disorders consists of people who are identified
through medical tests as generating antibodies to the AIDS virus. 1
A seropositive test result indicates that the person has been ex-
posed to the virus.32 However, a positive test result does not pre-
dict whether a person who tests seropositive will develop ARC or
AIDS, or will ever be capable of transmitting either disorder to any
other person. More simply, these people might carry the AIDS vi-
rus without manifesting any AIDS-related affliction.33
II. DISCRIMINATION SUFFERED BY PEOPLE WITH AIDS-RELATED
DISORDERS
It is not uncommon for people with AIDS to be fired once it is
discovered that they have the disorder. In California, for example,
an employee of a multinational corporation was fired after he alleg-
edly contracted AIDS.34 Similar firings have occurred with respect
to a Florida county employee, 35 a Maryland computer operator,36 a
27. Medical experts disapprove of the once-popular term "pre-AIDS" because there is
not as yet any way to predict which people with ARC will develop AIDS. See NIH Confer-
ence, supra note 10, at 800; Council Report, supra note 11 at 2037; DOJ Memorandum,
supra note 10, at 9.
28. DOJ Memorandum, supra note 10, at D-3.
29. Id.
30. HOLT. AIDS FROM THE EMPLOYEE [PERSON WITH AIDS'] PERSPECTIVE (1985) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file, Florida State University).
31. See Screening Recommendations, supra note 23, at 1; Workplace Recommenda-
tions, supra note 15, at 684.
32. HOLT, supra note 30, at 5.
33. See DOJ Memorandum, supra note 10, at D-2 n.7 (A February 1985 analysis of six
studies suggested that 400,000 people in the United States may then have been infected
with the AIDS virus and that 4"% to 19"1 of those so exposed would develop AIDS.). See
also Boffey, AIDS in the Future: Experts say deaths will climb sharply, N.Y. Times, Jan.
14, 1986, at C1, col. 3 (A more recent study suggests that the percentage of people who test
seropositive and later develop AIDS may be as high as 34%.). See generally Schatz, The
AIDS Insurance Crisis: Underwriting or Overreaching, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1782 (1987), for
an excellent discussion of the inadequacies of HIV testing and the potential for discrimina-
tion that it creates.
34. Eastman Kodak Sued for Firing Worker with AIDS, 1 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No.
6, at 2 (Apr. 9, 1986).
35. Florida Comm'n on Human Relations, FCHR No. 85-0624 (Dec. 11, 1985), reprinted
in 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) (Empl. Prac. Dec.) 5014 ("An employer violated the state
1987]
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Virginia draftsman employed at his company for twelve years,37
and a Virginia doctor who operated a walk-in clinic."' Other dis-
crimination has occured in the form of job reassignment, physical
isolation, and restrictions on familial relationships. In Illinois, for
example, a flight attendant who had AIDS was reassigned from
flight duty to an office job because flight duty involved food han-
dling.39 Similarly, a fourteen-year-old hemophiliac in Indiana who
contracted AIDS through a blood transfusion was involved in a
running battle to be admitted to his local public junior high
school.40 In New York City, some forty sanitation workers refused
to work out of the same garage as a co-worker who was diagnosed
with AIDS.41 In New Jersey, a judge ruled that a father who had
AIDS should not be barred on that basis from having visitation
rights with his child.4' One can only speculate about the extent to
which the fear of AIDS contagion will further complicate custody
and visitation issues between parents undergoing a divorce."3
law prohibiting discrimination in employment because of handicap when it discharged one
of its employees for contracting AIDS.").
36. Computer Firm Sued Over Hiring, 1 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 16, at 4 (Aug. 27,
1986) ("A computer operator fired by Electronic Data Systems Corp. filed suit against the
Texas-based firm August 14, charging that he was wrongfully terminated by a Maryland
facility because he has AIDS.").
37. Draftsman Files First Washington-Area Case, 1 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 3, at 7
(Feb. 26, 1986) (The plaintiff, "who had worked for the company for more than 12 years,
was diagnosed with AIDS in the summer of 1985 when he was hospitalized for pneumonia.
He told his employer of the diagnosis and was fired when he returned to work.").
38. Virginia Doctor's Suit Settled, 1 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 15, at 3 (Aug. 13, 1986)
(A doctor, who had his contract as an operator of a walk-in clinic terminated after he was
diagnosed as having AIDS, filed suit against the Missouri-based employer, charging breach
of contract as well as handicap discrimination.).
39. Settlement Sought in Airlines Case, 1 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 13, at 6 (July 16,
1986).
40. Two Students Resume Classes; One Barred, 1 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 3, at 6, 7
(Feb. 26, 1986) (Ryan White, a 14-year-old hemophiliac with AIDS, returned to class Feb.
21, but was barred from class again on the same day by a county circuit court judge.); White
Returns to School After Injunction Lifted, 1 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 7, at 6 (Apr. 23,
1986) (Ryan White returned to school after dismissal of a preliminary injunction that barred
him from classes because he is inflicted with the AIDS virus.).
41. Sanitation Workers Refuse to Work with Colleague, 1 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No.
12, at 7 (July 2, 1986) ("Some 40 New York City sanitation workers refused on June 23 to
work out of the same garage as as colleague diagnosed with AIDS. The New York Sanitation
Department suspended the workers without pay. However, they returned to the job the
following day, after the person with AIDS volunteered to be transferred to a solitary night
watchman's job.").
42. 1 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 10, at 6 (June 4, 1986).
43. See Court Vacates Ruling on Test for Gay Father, 1 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 11,
at 2 (June 18, 1986). (The judge vacated a ruling that a divorced gay father must undergo an
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People with ARC and those who merely test seropositive also
have been subjected to discrimination. In Florida, for example, the
father of seven-year-old Haitian triplets, who were diagnosed as
having ARC, charged the Dade County School Board with discrim-
ination and asked that the children be admitted to a normal class-
room setting."" Similarly, a Louisiana hospital was sued for handi-
cap discrimination by a former employee who was fired after he
refused to submit to blood tests to determine whether he was sero-
positive."5 A Texas medical center was charged with violating the
Rehabilitation Act after it fired a cafeteria worker who tested
seropositive.' a
In addition to actual incidents of discrimination against people
with AIDS-related disorders, an hysteria surrounds the disorder
which appears to justify irrational and unfounded discrimination.
A 1986 California referendum question would have declared AIDS
"an infectious, contagious and communicable disease" and would
have subjected people with AIDS, ARC, or who tested seropositive,
to quarantine and isolation." The Illinois Legislature passed sev-
HTLV-IIl/LAV (HIV) test before he can have overnight visitation rights with his two
children).
44. Suit Seeks Class Attendance for Triplets with ARC, 1 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No.
15, at 4 (Aug. 13, 1986).
45. Justice Ruling Seen Challenged, 1 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 19, at 4 (Oct. 8,
1986). See also Louisiana Lawsuit Challenges Discharge, 1 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 1,
at 8 (Jan. 29, 1986).
46. AIDS-as-Disability Debate Fueled by Bias Case, 1 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 3, at
3 (Feb. 26, 1986). See also Labor Department Accepts Four AIDS Bias Charges, 1 AIDS
Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 5, at 2, 3 (Mar. 26, 1986) ("The Department of Labor will investigate
four complaints of AIDS-based employment discrimination that have been filed against two
Dallas-based companies [one of the employees had AIDS, the other three had confirmed
positive HTLV-III/LAV (HIV) antibody tests] .... All four of the employees are still re-
ceiving pay and benefits, but none are allowed to come to work, according to their attor-
ney."); Board Rebuffs Union on Barring Students, 1 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 4, at 8
(Mar. 12, 1986) ("A school district in South Florida [Broward County] rejected on March 6
a union request that a retarded student who is positive for antibodies to the HTLV-III/LAV
virus be removed from school."). See also N.Y. Times, June 12, 1987, at B4, col. 3 (A 14-
year-old Pensacola boy, who has been exposed to AIDS, has been placed in a psychiatric
hospital.); N.Y. Times, June 16, 1987, at B9, col. 5 (quarantine lifted in the case of the 14-
year-old Pensacola boy).
47. Californians to Vote on Adding AIDS to Disease List, 1 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No.
11, at 4 (July 2, 1986). The referendum question was defeated by a vote of 71% to 29%.
California's Proposition 64 Overwhelmingly Rejected by Voters, 1 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA)
No. 21, at 1 (Nov. 5, 1986). However, moves are underway to place the identical referendum
back on the ballot. In Brief, 2 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 14, at 8 (July 29, 1987). See also
Attorney Urges Campaign Against State Bill, 1 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 11, at 4 (June
18, 1986) (The Louisiana Legislature proposed legislation that "allows the head of the state
health department to apply to any judge of any civil jurisdiction including municipal court
judges and parish court judges to get an arrest warrant for a person who has a contagious
1987]
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enteen AIDS-related bills which await the governor's signature.
These bills would, among other things, require HIV testing for all
applicants for marriage licenses, all hospital admittees between the
ages of thirty-four and fifty-five, and all inmates at the time of
intake, during routine medical checkups and sixty days prior to
release."8 The Georgia State Board of Education has adopted a rule
to require mandatory HIV testing of secondary school teachers and
pupils who are suspected of having AIDS.4 9 And in Massachusetts,
a telephone company lineman, who was fired after disclosing to his
supervisor that he had ARC, "never returned to work after co-
workers threatened to lynch him if he attempt[ed] to reclaim his
job."50
Discrimination suffered by people with AIDS, ARC and who test
seropositive (collectively referred to as AIDS-related disorders)
primarily is due to two factors. They are: (1) the fact that most of
the affected people belong to socially ostracized classes;51 and (2)
the hysteria surrounding the fear of possibly catching an incurable
and fatal disease through casual social contact.52 Since the great
disease with no provision for any hearing or any release or any bond or any of the other
things we're used to, for instance, in the mental health field."). This measure passed the
Louisiana House of Representatives but failed on a floor vote in the Senate. Marriage Li-
cense Tests Approved in Louisiana, 2 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 14, at 8 (July 29, 1987).
48. Governor Getting Pressure Over 17 AIDS-Related Bills, 2 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA)
No. 14, at 3 (July 29, 1987).
49. Georgia Education Board Approves Mandatory Tests, 2 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA)
No. 11, at 3 (June 17, 1987).
50. Court Rules AIDS Handicap Under Massachusetts Law, 1 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA)
No. 18, at 2 (Sept. 24, 1986). See also AIDS Victim's Colleagues Walk Out, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 23, 1986, at A24, col. 1 (A man's return to work leads to a walkout by most of his co-
workers).
51. Mills, Wofsy & Mills, The Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: Infection Control
and Public Health Law, 314 N. ENG. J. MED. 14, 931 (Apr. 3, 1986) [hereinafter Mills]
("AIDS occurs most often in populations frequently ostracized-homosexual men and intra-
venous drug users."). See also Education and Foster Care of Children Infected with
Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus, 34 MMWR
517, 518 (1986) [hereinafter Education and Foster Care] ("The diagnosis of AIDS or associ-
ated illnesses . . .may evoke suspicion of life styles that may not be acceptable to some
persons.").
52. See Sande, supra note 16, at 380:
[Pleople reacted to the fact that AIDS is caused by a virus with a hysteria remi-
niscent of another viral infection-the polio epidemic of the early 1950's .... The
recognition of an asymptomatic-carrier state amplified the fear of sexual contagion
in our society, and that fear was further intensified by reports of widespread
transmission of the AIDS virus by heterosexual activity in Africa .... Probably
the most sensational information, and perhaps the most misleading, was that the
virus has been isolated from saliva and then from tears. This suggested to the
public that the disease might be spread by food handlers, by kissing or shaking
hands, or even by contact with fomites. The media did little to dispel these no-
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weight of medical and scientific evidence establishes that AIDS-
related disorders are communicated only through the intravenous
transfer of blood and blood products, or through intimate sexual
contact, all discrimination involving casual social contact with peo-
ple who have AIDS-related disorders is unjustified.5 3 This conclu-
tions; on the contrary, the public was led to believe that AIDS was a highly conta-
gious disease . . . . Responses have been varied, including calls for quarantine,
mass screening of all potentially infected persons, expulsion from military service
of all antibody-positive personnel, and exclusion of infected children from schools.
In some cases refusal to care for AIDS patients has been condoned.
53. See HTLV-Ill/LAV Agent Summary Statement, 35 MMWR 540 (1986) ("As of
Aug. 15, 1986 no cases of [AIDS] that meet the CDC case definition and can be attributed to
an inadvertent laboratory exposure have been reported in laboratory workers."); Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome in Correctiondt Facilities: A Report of the National Institute
of Justice and the American Correctional Association, 35 MMWR 195, 198 (1986) ("The
apparent lack of reported AIDS cases among correctional staff as a result of contact with
inmates is consistent with previous findings that the risk of HTLV-III/LAV transmission in
occupational settings is extremely low and does not appear to result from casual contact.");
Friedland, supra note 15, at 344, said that "[e]xcept for sexual partners and children born
to infected mothers, none of the family members in more than 12,000 cases reported to the
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) are known to have contracted AIDS (CDC: unpublished
data)." Also:
In this study, despite prolonged and close contact with patients with AIDS or
AIDS-related complex, 100 of 101 household contacts did not contract HTLV-III/
LAV infection [and this one case involved a five-year-old child whose mother had
AIDS and who appears to have acquired the disorder by perinatal transmission
since he had signs and symptoms of HTLV-III/LAV infection since infancy]....
We conclude that nonsexual household contacts of patients with AIDS or AIDS-
related complex with oral candidiasis are at minimal or no risk for horizontal
transmission of HTLV-III/LAV infection (95 percent confidence interval, 0 to 2
percent) .... This study supports the view that transmission of the infection
requires injection of blood or blood products or intimate sexual contact, and that
longstanding household exposure to patients with AIDS is associated with little or
no risk of transmission of HTLV-III/LAV infection.
Id. at 347-48. See also The Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 252 J.A.M.A. 2037, 2042
(1984) ("Patients with AIDS are not a danger to the general hospital community; there is no
evidence of transmission via casual skin contact or airborne spread via respiratory drop-
lets."). Also worth note are the following passages:
Over 1750 health care workers with intense exposure to patients with AIDS
have been studied for evidence of antibody to the AIDS virus. Of the workers not
otherwise members of high-risk groups... less than 0.1 percent were found to be
antibody positive. In our institution (San Francisco General Hospital), more than
300 health care workers with intense and sustained exposure to patients with
AIDS for nearly four years have been studied; all are antibody negative, with the
exception of 14 of 50 homosexual male hospital workers .... Can the disease be
contracted by an accidental needle stick with a needle contaminated by blood
from a patient with AIDS? Probably yes, but with an extremely low frequency
(less than 0.5 percent).
Sande, supra note 16, at 381.
Studies of nonsexual household contacts of AIDS patients indicates that casual
contact with saliva and tears does not result in transmission of infection. Spread
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sion leads to the question of whether there are means under fed-
eral, state, or local law to remedy the resulting discrimination.
III. THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973
Examination of whether federal law provides a remedy against
discrimination for people with AIDS-related disorders begins with
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.1" Congress passed the Act to pre-
vent discrimination against the handicapped.55 Congress recog-
nized that a large number of handicapped people who were capable
of working were unemployed due to myths and stereotypes that
of infection to household contacts of infected persons has not been detected when
the household contacts have not been sex partners or have not been infants of
infected mothers. The kind of nonsexual person-to-person contact that generally
occurs among workers and clients or consumers in the workplace does not pose a
risk for transmission of HTLV-III/LAV.
Workplace Recommendations, supra note 15, at 682. See also Education and Foster Care,
supra note 51, at 519 ("Based on current evidence, casual person-to-person contact as would
occur among schoolchildren appears to pose no risk."). See also No HIV Transmission
Found Among Medical Personnel, 2 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 13, at 3 (July 15, 1987).
But see N.Y. Times, May 20, 1987, at Al, col. 3 (Three health workers found to be infected
by blood of AIDS patients but in all three cases the health worker either sustained pro-
longed exposure to blood or the blood entered the mouth or an open sore).
54. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96 (1982)).
55. Congress originally defined a "handicapped individual" as "any individual who (A)
has a physical or mental disability which for such individual constitutes or results in a sub-
stantial handicap to employment and (B) can reasonably be expected to benefit in terms of
employability from vocational rehabilitation services provided pursuant to Title I and III of
this Act." Id. at § 7(6). But Congress concluded:
That definition has proven to be troublesome in its application to provisions of
the Act such as sections 503 and 504 because of its orientation toward employ-
ment and its relation to vocational rehabilitation services. It was clearly the intent
of the Congress in adopting section 503 (affirmative action) and section 504 (non-
discrimination) that the term 'handicapped individual' in those sections was not
to be narrowly limited to employment (in the case of section 504), nor to the indi-
vidual's potential benefit from vocational rehabilitation services under titles I and
III.
S. REP. No. 93-1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 38, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 6373, 6388 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 93-1297]. Accordingly,
[tihe amended definition eliminates any reference to employment and takes cogni-
zance of the fact that handicapped persons are discriminated against in a number
of ways. First, they are discriminated against when they are, in fact, handicapped.
... Second, they are discriminated against because they are classified or labeled,
correctly or incorrectly, as handicapped .... Third, they are discriminated against
if they are regarded as handicapped, regardless of whether they are in fact
handicapped.
Id. at 6389.
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they could not be integrated into society,"6 and that extra costs
were incurred in accommodating their needs.17 Section 503 of the
Act prohibits discrimination against handicapped people by those
who contract with the federal government." Section 504 of the Act
56. Comment, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act: Analyzing Employment Discrimi-
nation Claims, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 867, 869 (1984) [hereinafter Analyzing Employment Dis-
crimination Claims] ("Congress noted that in many instances discrimination, and not a de-
ficiency of training, prevented handicapped individuals from finding and retaining
meaningful employment. Employers' stereotyped assumptions concerning the limitations of
handicapped individuals contributed to handicapped Americans' being an oppressed and
hidden minority."). See Note, Abroad in the Land: Legal Strategies to Effectuate the
Rights of the Physically Disabled, 61 GEo. L.J. 1501, 1513 (1973); Note, Accommodating the
Handicapped: Rehabilitating Section 504 after Southeastern, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 171, 173
(1980) [hereinafter Accommodating the Handicapped] (The Rehabilitation Act of 1973...
was thus meant to enable handicapped persons to achieve their full productive capability,
foster their self-sufficiency and independence, and integrate them into the community.").
Also, "[m]any employers do not believe that handicapped persons can perform jobs ade-
quately. Blanket refusals to hire persons with some or any disability are common among
employers." Id. at n.9.
57. Fear of higher costs through architectural modifications or higher insurance premi-
ums is a major factor inhibiting employers from accepting disabled applicants. Such fears
however are often unsubstantiated. See Note, Equal Protection and the Disabled: A Propo-
sal, 10 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 457, 485 (1974). The handicapped person is "all too often
excluded from schools and educational programs, barred from employment or [is] under-
employed because of archaic attitudes and laws, denied access to transportation, buildings,
and housing because of architectural barriers and lack of planning, and [is] discriminated
against by public laws." S. REP. No. 93-1297, supra note 54, at 6400.
[Tihe American people are simply unfamiliar with and [are] insensitive to difficul-
ties confronted [by] individuals with handicaps. The public lacks adequate knowl-
edge about the potential of these individuals to contribute significantly to society.
Too often we automatically make the assumption that nothing can be done .... It
is against the basic tenets of the scientific process to make an assumption of no
hope and no help. No less should be true of public policy. In the case of individu-
als with handicaps, making this assumption all too often has resulted in the viola-
tion of their basic rights as human beings and has condemned them to live useless
lives.
Id.
58. Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1982 & Supp. 1985)). Except as otherwise indicated, refer-
ences will be made to the relevant portion of the Rehabilitation Act Sections and not to the
United States Code. Section 503 of the Act states:
(a) Any contract in excess of $2,500 entered into by any Federal department or
agency for the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal services (includ-
ing construction) for the United States shall contain a provision requiring that, in
employing persons to carry out such contract the party contracting with the
United States shall take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment
qualified handicapped individuals as defined in section 706(7) of this title. The
provisions of this section shall apply to any subcontract in excess of $2,500 en-
tered into by a prime contractor in carrying out any contract for the procurement
of personal property and nonpersonal services (including construction) for the
United States. The President shall implement the provisions of this section by
promulgating regulations within ninety days after September 26, 1973.
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prohibits discrimination against handicapped people by all organi-
zations that receive federal financial assistance. 9 The Department
of Labor and the Department of Health and Human Services have
responsibility for enforcing these provisions.6 0 The regulations of
these two departments should be read together when implement-
ing the definition of a "handicapped individual," and are central to
determining whether people with AIDS-related disorders come
within the scope of that definition.6 1
Determination of whether people with AIDS-related disorders
come within the coverage of the Act requires an examination of
section 504. Included in this analysis are the applicable regulations
and judicial decisions. Section 504 of the Act provides: "No other-
wise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as de-
fined in section 7(6), shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be ex-
cluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiv-
ing [f]ederal financial assistance." ' 2 Therefore, a section 504 plain-
tiff must satisfy each of five requisite elements:
(1)handicapped individual
(2)solely by reason of handicap
(3)otherwise qualified
(4)excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination
(5)program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.
59. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982)).
60. The Department of Labor was directed by Executive Order to adopt regulations to
implement section 503. See Exec. Order No. 11,758, 3a C.F.R. 116 (1974) (empowering the
Secretary of the Department of Labor to issue regulations under section 503 of the Rehabili-
tation Act applicable to all federal agencies). Similarly, the Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare was directed to adopt regulations to implement section 504. See Exec.
Order No. 11,914 3 C.F.R. 117 (1976) (empowering the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare to issue regulations under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act applicable to all
federal agencies. Upon its creation, the Department of Health and Human Services assumed
the responsibilities of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare over section 504.
The Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, 93 Stat. 669 (codified at
20 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3510 (1982)).
61. When Congress enacted the new definiton of handicapped individual it stated:
It is intended that sections 503 and 504 be administered in such a manner that a
consistent, uniform, and effective Federal approach to discrimination against
handicapped persons would result. Thus, Federal agencies and departments
should cooperate in developing standards and policies so that there is a uniform,
consistent Federal approach to these sections.
S. REP. No. 93-1297, supra note 54, at 6391.
62. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1982)).
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In this Article the author will examine the first element, "handi-
capped individual," the second element, "solely by reason of hand-
icap," and the third element, "otherwise qualified," respectively.
Elements four and five shall be assumed for the purposes of this
discussion."
A. Handicapped Individual
The first element, "handicapped individual," has not been the
subject of extensive judicial interpretation. 4 This may be because,
in most suits brought under the Act, the defendant concedes the
handicap.6 5 Nevertheless, in the few cases in which the definition
63. With respect to the fifth element, the focus of inquiry is whether the defendant was
a recipient of federal funds, directly or indirectly. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S.
555 (1984). At issue was the applicability of provisions of Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972, which prohibited sex discrimination in any educational program or activity
receiving federal financial assistance. The Court rejected the argument that the statute ap-
plied only to direct recipients of federal financial assistance. "There is no basis in the stat-
ute for the view that only institutions that themselves apply for federal aid or receive checks
directly from the Federal Government are subject to regulation." Id. at 564. It is enough
that the defendant has benefitted in some way from federal financial assistance that was
received by another. United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of America, 106
S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (1986): "The statute covers those who receive the aid, but does not extend
as far as those who benefit from it." The key word is "receive" because the receipt of federal
funds operates as a quid pro quo that justifies imposition of the duties and obligations con-
tained in the Rehabilitation Act. As the Court in Paralyzed Veterans explained:
Congress limited the scope of section 504 to those who actually "receive" federal
financial assistance because it sought to impose section 504 coverage as a form of
contractual cost of the recipient's agreement to accept the federal funds. "Con-
gress apparently determined that it would require contractors and grantees to
bear the costs of providing employment for the handicapped as a quid pro quo for
the receipt of federal funds" . . . . Under the program specific statutes, Title VI,
Title IX, and section 504, Congress enters into an arrangement in on the nature of
a contract with the recipients of the funds: the recipient's acceptance of the funds
triggers coverage under the nondiscrimination provision. . . . By limiting coverage
to recipients, Congress imposes the obligations of section 504 upon those who are
in a position to accept or reject those obligations as a part of the decision whether
or not to "receive" federal funds.
Id. at 2711.
64. See Note, AIDS: Does it Qualify as a "Handicap" Under the Rehabilitation Act of
1973?, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 572, 587 (1986) [hereinafter AIDS as Handicap].
65. Id. at 587 n.93. See Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985) (epilepsy);
Norcross v. Sneed, 755 F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1985) (congenital visual impairment); Bentivegna
v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982) (diabetes); Doe v. New York
Univ., 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981) (severe mental illness); Simon v. St. Louis County, 656
F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 976 (1982) (paraplegic); Carty v. Carlin, 623
F. Supp. 1181 (D. Md. 1985) (heart attack, nervous breakdown, hernia); Bento v. I.T.O.
Corp., 599 F. Supp. 731 (D.R.I. 1984) (heart bypass surgery); Fitzgerald v. Green Valley
Area Educ. Agency, 589 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Iowa 1984) (nocturnal epilepsy, dyslexia, cere-
bral palsy); Klein v. Albro, No. 81-CV-1288 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 1982) (muscular dystrophy)
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of a "handicapped individual" was contested, the term has been
interpreted broadly." The Act defines handicapped individual as
"any individual who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activi-
ties, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as
having such an impairment."" Notwithstanding the fact that Con-
gress intended that the section be given broad scope, this defini-
tion needs further elaboration because such terms as "physical or
mental impairment," "substantially limits," and "major life activi-
ties," are ambiguous. 8 These ambiguities may be removed by ex-
amining how those terms have been applied in previous judicial
opinions to non-AIDS-related disorders. This will demonstrate
that extending the scope of "handicapped individual" to people
with AIDS-related disorders is consistent with the legislative
scheme.
(available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file); Longoria v. Harris, 554 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.
Tex. 1982) (amputee); Bey v. Bolger, 540 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (record of physical
impairment, cardiac disease); Doe v. Syracuse School Dist., 508 F. Supp. 333 (N.D.N.Y.
1981) (history of prior nervous breakdown); Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F.
Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (epilepsy).
66. See E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1098 (D. Haw. 1980), vacated
and remanded, E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Donovan, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1183 (D. Haw.
1981) ("Congress wanted the statute to have broad coverage and effect."). For examples of
some unusual conditions that have qualified, see, e.g., Fynes v. Weinberger, C.A. 85-0427
(E.D. Pa. July 22, 1985) (asbestosis) (available on LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist. file); Boyd
v. United States Postal Serv., 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1217, 1221 (Wash. 1983) (For
the purpose of discussion, court assumes that post-traumatic stress disorder suffered by a
Vietnam War era veteran is a handicap.); Vickers v. Veterans' Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85
(W.D. Wash. 1982) (unusual sensitivity to tobacco smoke which made employee incapable of
working in anything other than a smoke-free environment); Daubert v. United States Postal
Service, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 459, 461 (D. Colo. 1982), aff'd, 733 F.2d 1367 (10th
Cir. 1984) (back injury is a handicap).
67. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982 & Supp. 1985).
68.
Clause (A) in the new definition eliminates any reference to employment and
makes the definition applicable to the provision of Federally-assisted services and
programs .. . Clause (B) is intended to make clearer that the coverage of section
503 and 504 extends to persons who have recovered-in whole or in part-from a
handicapping condition, such as mental or neurological illness, a heart attack, or
cancer and to persons who were classified as handicapped (for example, as men-
tally ill or mentally retarded) but who may be discriminated against or otherwise
be in need of the protection of sections 503 and 504 .... [Clause (C)] includes
within the protection of sections 503 and 504 those persons who do not in fact
have the condition which they are perceived as having, as well as those persons
whose mental or physical condition does not substantially limit their life activities
and who thus are not technically within clause (A) in the new definition.
S. REP. No. 1297, supra note 54, at 6389-90.
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1. Physical or Mental Impairment
Section 504 of the Act defines a handicapped person as any indi-
vidual who has a "physical or mental impairment." Such handi-
caps include:
(A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigure-
ment, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following
body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs;
respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive,
digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endo-
crine; or (B) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness,
and specific learning disabilities. 9
AIDS arguably is a physical impairment since it operates, in
part, as a "physiological disorder or condition affecting" the
"hemic and lymphatic" systems. 70 This analysis is supported by
the liberal approach taken by the Department of Health and
Human Services in its regulations that interpret the phrase, "phys-
ical or mental impairment."'71 Accordingly, the department's analy-
sis rejects efforts to limit the scope of the statute's protection to
traditional handicaps.72 Furthermore, the department has deter-
mined that it is immaterial whether a specific handicap such as
AIDS was recognized as a "physical impairment" at the time that
Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act.7"
2. Substantially Limits
The statute elaborates upon its definition by identifying a handi-
capped person as any individual who has a physical or mental im-
69. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1985) (emphasis supplied).
70. AIDS as Handicap, supra note 64, at 583.
71. The definition does not set forth a list of specific diseases and conditions that consti-
tute physical or mental impairments "because of the difficulty of ensuring the comprehen-
siveness of any such list." 45 C.F.R. § 84 App. A subpart A(3) (1985).
72.
Comments suggested narrowing the definition in various ways. The most common
recommendation was that only 'traditional' handicaps be covered. The Depart-
ment continues to believe, however, that it has no flexibility within the statutory
definition to limit the term to persons who have those severe, permanent, or pro-
gressive conditions that are commonly regarded as handicaps.
Id.
73. AIDS as Handicap, supra note 64, at 583-84.
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pairment which "substantially limits . . . that individual. '7 4 The
phrase "substantially limits" is neither defined in the Act nor in
regulations promulgated under the Act by the Department of
Health and Human Services.75 The term is defined by the Depart-
ment of Labor in its regulations to enforce section 503.70 The De-
partment of Labor's definition understandably is focused on, and
is necessarily limited to, employment. Nevertheless, the term, es-
pecially when read in conjunction with the phrase "major life ac-
tivity," appears to refer to the extent to which an impairment im-
pacts upon the person.
Even though the term "handicap" has been given a liberal inter-
pretation, not every environmental, cultural, or economic disad-
vantage will find protection under section 504.17 Physical charac-
teristics that are neither illnesses, disorders, nor deformities are
not considered handicaps. 78 Even illnesses may be excluded if they
are temporary.79 Minor physical impairments do not qualify as
handicaps, either.80 And where only a few jobs are foreclosed to a
74. See 45 C.F.R. § 84 App. A subpart A(3) (1985) ("Several comments observed the lack
of any definition in the proposed regulation of the phrase 'substantially limits.' The Depart-
ment does not believe that a definition of this term is possible at this time."). See also AIDS
as Handicap, supra note 64, at 584 n.77: "As one observer noted, 'The most significant
restriction on the statutory definition of handicapped is the phrase 'substantially limits'; the
precise meaning of this phrase remains unclear.'" (quoting from Comment, Employment
Rights of Handicapped Individuals: Statutory and Judicial Parameters, 20 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 291, 294 (1978)).
75. See supra notes 70, 74. See also AIDS as Handicap, supra note 64, at 584 n.77.
76. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741 App. subpart C (1985) (Office of Federal Contract Compliance
Programs).
77. "Thus, environmental, cultural and economic disadvantage are not in themselves
covered; nor are prison records, age, or homosexuality." 45 C.F.R. § 84 App. A (3). But cf.
id.: "Of course, if a person who has any of those characteristics also has a physical or mental
handicap, the person is included within the definition of handicapped person." See also
AIDS as Handicap, supra note 64, at 583-84.
78. See de la Torres v. Bolger, 781 F.2d 1134, 1138 (5th Cir. 1986) (left-handedness "is a
physical characteristic, not a chronic illness, a disorder or deformity, or a mental disability,
or a condition affecting ... health."); Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 746
(C.D. Cal. 1984) (muscular build not an impairment even though plaintiff could not meet
airline's weight requirements).
79. Stevens v. Stubbs, 576 F. Supp. 1409, 1414 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (transitory illness with
no permanent effect on plaintiff's health is not an impairment).
80. Jansany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1250 n.6 (6th Cir. 1985) (cross-
eyes may be "so minor that [they do] not rise to the level of a physical impairment."). See
also Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986):
The Rehabilitation Act assures that truly disabled, but genuinely capable, individ-
uals will not face discrimination in employment because of stereotypes about the
insurmountability of their handicaps. It would debase this high purpose if the
statutory protections to those truly handicapped could be claimed by anyone
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handicapped person, it cannot be claimed that the handicap "sub-
stantially limits" the person's major life activities."'
Undoubtedly, AIDS "substantially limits" one's major life activi-
ties, for as one commentator stated:
Few impairments have as profound an impact on one's personal
autonomy as does AIDS. When AIDS renders the body incapable
of combatting disease, many, if not most, aspects of the victim's
life are drastically altered. Due to the physically disabling effects
of the disease and to the public stigma attached to contracting
the disease, the victim's ability to function in society and at the
workplace may be greatly hindered, i.e., 'substantially limited.'"2
Therefore, AIDS appears to qualify under the Act as a "physical
impairment" that "substantially limits" one's "major life activi-
ties." The disorder is neither minor nor temporary, and is not the
result of environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantage. In-
stead, AIDS is progressive, degenerative, incurable and fatal.
3. Major Life Activities
The Act requires that a "handicapped individual" be not only
one who has a "physical or mental impairment" which "substan-
tially limits" but also that it affect such person's "major life activi-
ties." The phrase "major life activities" has been defined to mean
"functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and work-
whose disability was minor and whose relative severity of impairment was widely
shared.
81. See E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1098 (D. Haw. 1980), vacated
and remanded sub nom., E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Donovan, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1183
(D. Haw. 1981) (concluding that an impairment that interfered with an individual's ability
to do a particular job, but did not significantly decrease that individual's ability to obtain
satisfactory employment otherwise, was not substantially limiting within the meaning of the
statute). See also Salt Lake City Corp. v. Confer, 674 P.2d 632, 636-37 (Utah 1983) ("partic-
ular job for one particular employer cannot be a 'major life activity' " (emphasis in origi-
nal)). Jansany, 755 F.2d at 1249 ("Characteristics such as average height or strength that
render an individual incapable of performing particular jobs are not covered by the statute
because they are not impairments.") (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted); Osterling v.
Walters, 760 F.2d 859 (8th Cir. 1985) (varicose veins not a handicap); Tudyman v. United
Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 745 (C.D. Cal. 1984) ("There is, however, no authority for the
proposition that failure to'qualify for a single job because of some impairment that a plain-
tiff would otherwise be qualified to perform constitutes being limited in a major life
activity.").
82. AIDS as Handicap, supra note 64, at 585.
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ing.'" 8 A diagnosis of AIDS would appear to "substantially limit"
one's "major life activities":
The extensive medical treatment an AIDS victim typically re-
quires over the course of his disease shows that he will frequently
be unable to care for himself. As the disease progresses, an AIDS
victim's capacity to work will invariably diminish. If the AIDS
victim contracts a disease such as PCP, which attacks the respira-
tory system, breathing will be inhibited. The mere diagnosis of
AIDS will, in most instances, profoundly affect the victim's social
interactions with other people. 4
Determining whether people with ARC meet the statutory defi-
nition of "handicapped individuals" is problematic, since no uni-
form definition of ARC exists.8 5 Nevertheless, to the extent that
such people suffer illnesses that "substantially limit" their ability
to engage in "major life activities," they would come within the
scope of section 504. Even the United States Department of Jus-
tice, which has argued against bringing most people with AIDS-
related disorders under section 504 of the Act, has acknowledged
that, "if the effects of ARC do not render a particular individual
handicapped, the individual may be protected [from discrimina-
tion] by section 504 if he can show that he suffered discrimination
because he was regarded as suffering from the disabling effects of
AIDS." 86
People who test seropositive also may be determined to be
"handicapped individuals," thereby obtaining protection from dis-
crimination. A person with a seropositive test result would qualify
as a "handicapped individual" within the first element of section
504 to the extent that the basis for the discrimination is the per-
83. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3()(2)(ii) (1985).
84. AIDS as Handicap, supra note 64, at 585. Although the U.S. Department of Justice
concedes that a person with AIDS qualifies as a "handicapped individual" under the first
element of section 504, DOJ Memorandum, supra note 10, at D-7-8, it has taken the posi-
tion that people with AIDS are discriminated against on the basis of an irrational fear of
contagion, not "solely by reason of handicap" under the second element of section 504. Id.
at D-10. Since the plaintiff has the burden of establishing each and every element of his
claim under section 504, the Department's argument, if accepted, would defeat a plaintiff's
section 504 action. See, e.g., Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 230 (3d Cir.
1983); Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 774-75 (2d Cir. 1981).
85. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text. See also DOJ Memorandum, supra
note 10, at D-9 ("Persons suffering from ARC present a somewhat different question. Be-
cause of the definitional imprecision of this condiditon ... it does not appear possible to set
down a uniform rule for ARC patients").
86. DOJ Memorandum, supra note 10, at D-9 n.71.
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ception that the person was suffering from, or would soon suffer
from, the disabling effects of AIDS, which is itself within the cov-
erage of section 504.87
B. Solely by Reason of Handicap
Even if people with AIDS-related disorders are "handicapped in-
dividuals" as defined by section 504, the discrimination must have
resulted "solely by the reason of handicap" to come within the
scope of the Act. Discrimination against people with AIDS-related
disorders may arise out of a fear of contagion. This fear may be
honest and sincere regardless of the absence of any medical or sci-
entific data to justify it. Since under these circumstances, the dis-
crimination does not result "solely by reason of handicap," the
United States Department of Justice has argued that the fear of
contagion immunizes conduct otherwise violative of section 504.88
The argument is based on three assumptions: first, that Congress
intended to extract the ability to transmit the contagious disease
from the protection otherwise provided by section 504 to those
who suffer from the disabling effects of a contagious disease; sec-
ond, that people who have or are perceived to have the ability to
transmit the disabling effects of a contagious disease suffer no
"physical or mental impairment" as that term is used in regula-
tions; and third, that the sincerity of a defendant's fear of conta-
gion eliminates the need to present medical or scientific evidence
to justify it. Each of these assumptions is examined in turn.
The validity of the assumption that Congress intended to elimi-
nate from section 504 those who transmit a contagious disease
without suffering from the disabling effects depends on Congres-
sional intent, voiced either in express statutory language or persua-
sive legislative history. 9 There is no evidence that Congress in-
tended to limit the Act in that manner. However, there is evidence
to suggest that where Congress wished to exclude certain aspects of
a disorder from the broad protection otherwise provided in section
504, it did so unequivocally. 0 Accordingly, when the Attorney
87. See supra notes 68-83 and accompanying text.
88. DOJ Memorandum, supra note 10, at D- 7-13.
89. See supra note 68.
90. See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 503-507 (1982) (In light of express
language of section 1973 and intent of Congress to "throw open the doors of the United
States courts" to individuals suffering from discrimination, policy considerations alone could
not justify a judicially imposed exhaustion requirement). Accord Monell v. Department of
Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 695-701 (1978) (Among the factors to be considered in determin-
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General of the United States issued an opinion that supported the
inclusion of alcoholics and drug addicts in the definition of "handi-
capped individuals," 9' Congress sought to clarify its intent. Con-
gress separated reformed alcoholics from others, and declared that
reformed alcoholics could not be discriminated against either be-
cause they drank previously, or notwithstanding their nondrinker
status, because they were still medically classified as alcoholic. By
contrast, unreformed alcoholics whose present consumption of al-
cohol impairs or impedes their abilities, could "be excluded from
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination" without violating section 504.92
The second assumption of the Department of Justice is that peo-
ple who have or who are perceived to have the ability to transmit
the disabling effects of a contagious disease suffer no "physical or
mental impairment" because "the carrier's condition-the pres-
ence within his body of the active infectious agent-has no adverse
physical consequences for him. '9 3 Assuming for the moment that
there must be some physical manifestation to constitute an "im-
pairment" as that term is used in section 504, the presence within
a person of a deadly agent that may or may not be transmitted to
another is a physical manifestation. 4 More importantly, to the ex-
ing whether the Court should reconsider or overrule prior precedent are: (1) whether the
decisions in question misconstrued the statute as revealed in its legislative history, and (2)
whether overruling those decisions would be consistent with more recent Congressional pro-
nouncements). See also TransAmerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15
(1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979) (The key to statutory
construction is the language of the statute itself); Department of Transp. v. Paralyzed Vet-
erans of Am., 106 S. Ct. 2705 (1986); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630,
639 (1981); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,
13 (1981) (look at statutory language, legislative history and prior judicial interpretations of
statute).
91. 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 1, 2 (1977).
92. H. REP. No. 95-1149, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7312, 7333-34 [hereinafter H. REP. No. 95-1149]:
The committee emphasizes that an individual with a record of alcohol or drug
abuse or who is regarded as being an individual who is an alcoholic or drug abuser
may still be protected by the provisions of sections 503 and 504 if he or she is not
in need of rehabilitation. This protects otherwise qualified self-reformed or rehga-
bilitated alcoholics or drug abusers from unreasonable discrimination.
Id. at 7334. See also id. at 7413: "The conference substitute clarifies that only those active
alcoholics or drug abusers who cannot perform the essential functions of a job in question or
who present a danger to life and property are not covered by the employment provisions of
sections 503 and 504."
93. See DOJ Memorandum, supra note 10, at D-8.
94. See New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 479
(E.D.N.Y. 1978), af'd, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979) (restricting mentally retarded students
affected with hepatitis B violated the Rehabilitation Act). See also District 27 Community
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tent that the assumption interprets "impairment" to require some
severe or significant physical manifestation, it is mistaken. Alco-
holism and drug addiction are protected under the Act."5 Similarly,
"mental impairments" need not produce severe or significant phys-
ical consequences.9 6 Even the subsidiary argument that AIDS-re-
lated disorders should be excluded from the Act because they were
acquired through voluntary conduct is unavailing because where
Congress wished to exclude voluntary conduct it did so explicitly."
Furthermore, it is unclear to what extent people with AIDS-related
disorders acquired them through voluntary conduct. The children
of AIDS patients, who were born with AIDS-related disorders, did
nothing to bring about their disabling condition. People exposed to
AIDS through blood transfusions, such as surgical patients and
hemophiliacs, no more engaged in culpable, "voluntary" conduct to
produce the injury than the innocent driver who is seriously in-
jured in an automobile accident. The fact that alcoholism and drug
addiction are covered under the statute itself belies the claim that
Congress intended to exclude handicapping conditions that were
acquired through voluntary, illegal or immoral conduct.
The third assumption of the Department of Justice is that the
sincerity of a defendant's fear of contagion made unnecessary the
need to establish its reasonableness based on medical or scientific
data. By excusing discrimination against people with AIDS-related
disorders based on an honest fear of contagion, the traditional ba-
sis for discrimination against handicapped individuals is perpetu-
School Bd. v. Board of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398, 502 N.Y.S. 2d 325 (1986) (Section 504
applied to uphold Board of Education's policy of not automatically excluding students with
AIDS from classroom over opposition from community school board).
95. See 43 Op. Atty Gen. 1, 2 (1977).
96. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)(B) (1985), which includes among the covered
"physical or mental impairment[s]" such mental or psychological disorders as "mental re-
tardation ... emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities."
97. Congress has excluded people whose own willful misconduct caused their injuries
when it has chosen to do so. See McKelvey v. Turnage, 792 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert.
granted sub nom., Traynor v. Turnage, 107 S. Ct. 1368 (1987).
In 1977, Congress amended the [G.I. Bill] to extend the limitation period for those
veterans who were unable to use their educational benefits during that period 'be-
cause of a physical or mental disability which was not the result of [their] own
willful misconduct.' The 'willful misconduct' qualification was not a new concept;
the same limitation was already contained in a number of previously enacted vet-
erans benefit provisions.
Id. at 196 (citation omitted).
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ated: that the handicapped represent too high a risk, either to
themselves or to others, to be hired. 8
Section 504 case law establishes beyond peradventure that at-
tempts to justify discrimination against the handicapped, based on
the handicapped presenting an elevated risk, have been rejected
unless based on scientific or medical data. In Mantolete v.
Bolger,99 an epileptic was denied a job with the United States Pos-
tal Service which would have required her to work with complex
mail sorting equipment. The Postal Service feared that the plain-
tiff might suffer an epileptic seizure during which she might injure
herself or others. The Ninth Circuit Court remanded, stating:
We agree ... that, in some cases, a job requirement that screens
out qualified handicapped individuals on the basis of possible fu-
ture injury is necessary. However, we hold that in order to ex-
clude such individuals, there must be a showing of a reasonable
probability of substantial harm. Such a determination cannot be
based merely on an employer's subjective evaluation or, except in
cases of a most apparent nature, merely on medical reports. The
question is whether, in light of the individual's work history and
medical history, employment of that individual would pose a rea-
sonable probability of substantial harm. 00
The argument that discrimination against the handicapped is non-
actionable if based on the elevated risk of harm to others, also has
been rejected by the Third Circuit. In Strathie v. Department of
Transportation,'01 a trained school bus driver had his class four
school bus license revoked after it was determined that his natural
hearing ability, unassisted by a hearing aid, did not fall within the
Department's standards. Strathie filed a class action to overturn
the Department's rule. The Department defended its rule on the
98. For example, even those who suffer or have recovered from such noninfectious dis-
eases as epilepsy or cancer have faced discrimination based on the irrational fear that they
might be contagious. As the late Senator Humphrey noted, the "irrational fears or prejudice
on the part of employers or fellow workers" often makes it difficult for former cancer pa-
tients to secure employment. 123 Cong. Rec. 13515 (1977). See also Feldman, Wellness and
Work, in PSvCHOLOOICAL STRESS AND CANCER 173 (C. Cooper ed. 1984) (documenting job
discrimination against recovered cancer patients); Sontag, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR 5-6 (1978)
("Any disease that is treated as a mystery and acutely enough feared will be felt to be
morally, if not literally, contagious. Thus, a surprisingly large number of people with cancer
find themselves being shunned by relatives and friends . . . as if cancer, like TB, were an
infectious disease.").
99. 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985).
100. Id. at 1422.
101. 716 F.2d 227 (3rd Cir. 1983).
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ground that it was "not only to provide for the safety of school bus
passengers, but to ensure the highest level of safety." 102 The court
of appeals rejected the argument because the Department's regula-
tions were legitimately concerned only with appreciable risks and
not with every conceivable risk possible.1 03
The Second Circuit also has rebuffed efforts to immunize other-
wise unlawful discrimination on the basis of unreasonable fears
that the handicapped present an elevated public risk. In New York
State Association for Retarded Children v. Carey,'" for example,
the court held that section 504 prevented a board of education
from excluding from its regular classrooms mentally retarded chil-
dren who were thought to be carriers of hepatitis when the board
was unable to demonstrate that the health hazard posed by the
children was anything more than a remote possibility.
C. Otherwise Qualified
Even if it is determined that a person with an AIDS-related dis-
order is a "handicapped individual" within the first and second el-
ements of section 504, it would still be necessary to establish that
he or she was "otherwise qualified." That inquiry focuses on two
aspects of the handicapped individual's condition: (1) whether the
person meets the requirements of a particular program or activity;
and (2) whether the person is capable of performing the work with-
out endangering himself or herself or others.10 5 Some courts have
102. Id. at 232.
103.
In our view, the essential nature of the program is to prevent any and all appreci-
able risks that a school bus driver will be unable to provide for the control over
and safety of his passengers. For example, we note that the Department allows the
granting of school bus driver's licenses to individuals who must wear eyeglasses in
order to meet Department vision standards. If such a person's eyeglasses were to
be removed, either voluntarily or involuntarily, while he was driving a school bus,
he would certainly present a danger to the safety of his passengers. That such an
individual is allowed to obtain a school bus driver's license indicates that the De-
partment views some safety risks as too removed to justify the denial of a school
bus driver's license.
Department of Transportation Regulations concerning other physical disabili-
ties confirm our description of the essential purpose of the school bus driver li-
censing program. For example, several physical aliments will prevent an individual
from obtaining such a license only if the ailment is likely to interfere with the
ability to drive a school bus with safety."
Id. at 232 (citations omitted).
104. 466 F. Supp. 479 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979).
105. Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983) (A licensed school
bus driver failed to meet regulations because hearing loss without the assistance of a hearing
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placed primary reliance on the second aspect of the "otherwise
qualified" element of section 504.10 But the Supreme Court eluci-
dated both aspects of the "otherwise qualified" element of section
504 in Southeastern Community College v. Davis,1 07 where South-
aid fell below a set standard. Even though danger to others would result if driver's hearing
aid became dislodged, the risk of that occurring was not appreciable.); Mahoney v. Ortiz,
645 F. Supp. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (police officer who had suffered two or more shoulder dislo-
cations was not "otherwise qualified" under reasonable medical standards for police employ-
ment); Pickut v. United States Air Force, 24 M.S.P.B. 433 (1984) (police officer with the Air
Force was not otherwise qualified where it was undisputed that he was unfit to carry a
weapon because of his psychological condition); Schmidt v. Bell, 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 839 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (Vietnam veteran who suffered from post-traumatic stress disor-
der was not otherwise qualified to be student loan officer, a stressful job); Coleman v. Casey
County Bd. of Educ., 510 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Ky. 1980) (school bus driver who had one leg
amputated was otherwise qualified to work despite a state law requiring bus drivers to have
both legs); Swann v. Walters, 620 F. Supp. 741 (D.D.C. 1984) (paranoid schizophrenic not
"otherwise qualified" for position that required security clearance).
106. See, e.g., Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985) (epileptic could be
otherwise qualified to be postal clerk); Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Mental Retarda-
tion Comm'n, 704 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1983) (Although psychiatric worker had an exemplary
work record and her attendance record was acceptable, evidence of her suicidal tendencies
rendered her not "otherwise qualified"); Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981)
(first-year medical student not "otherwise qualified" where severe mental problems
presented an unreasonable danger to herself and others); Pushkin v. Regents of the Univer-
sity of Colorado, 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981); New York State Ass'n of Retarded Children
v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979) (mentally retarded children who were carriers of hepa-
titis were otherwise qualified to be admitted to regular classrooms where it could not be
demonstrated that the health hazard posed by the children was anything more than a re-
mote possibility); District 27 Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398,
502 N.Y.S. 2d 325 (1986) (risk of contagion to other students sufficiently remote that stu-
dents with AIDS were otherwise qualified to be admitted to regular classroom); Carter v.
United States Postal Serv., 23 M.S.P.B. 504 (1984). See also Kelley v. Bechtel Power Corp.,
633 F. Supp. 927 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
Although a "handicapped individual" must meet both aspects of the "otherwise qualified"
element of section 504, some courts have placed primary emphasis on the first aspect of this
element. See, e.g., Norcross v. Sneed, 573 F. Supp. 533 (W.D. Ark. 1983), alI'd, 755 F.2d 113
(8th Cir. 1985) (A legally blind woman was otherwise qualified to be a school librarian, even
though playground and hall duty were within her job description, because librarians had
never been required to perform these duties.); Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369
(E.D. Pa. 1983), a/I'd without opinion, 732 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1188 (1985) (state ordered to provide readers for blind welfare workers so that they might
be "otherwise qualified"); Daubert v. United States Postal Serv., 733 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir.
1984) (postal clerk who had back problems was not "otherwise qualified"); Treadwell v.
Alexander, 707 F.2d 473 (11th Cir. 1983); Bentivegna v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694
F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982); Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981);
Carmi v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 471 F. Supp. 119 (E.D. Mo. 1979), a/I'd, 620
F.2d 672 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 892 (1980); Coley v. United States Dep't of the
Army, 29 M.S.P.B. 101 (1985); E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1098 (D.
Haw. 1980), vacated and remanded, E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Donovan, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1183 (D. Haw. 1981); Caylor v. Alexander, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 727 (M.D.
Ala. 1981); Guerriero v. Schultz, 557 F. Supp. 511 (D.D.C. 1983).
107. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
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eastern refused to admit to its federally-funded nursing program a
woman who could distinguish only "gross sounds" even with the
assistance of a hearing aid. The Court found for Southeastern, say-
ing that although there might be situations in which discrimination
is found when a recipient of federal funds refused to make a rea-
sonable accommodation for the handicapped,0 8 generally there is
no obligation to dispense with bona fide job requirements under
section 504 of the Act.
Section 504 by its terms does not compel educational institutions
to disregard the disabilities of handicapped individuals or to
make substantial modifications in their programs to allow dis-
abled persons to participate. Instead, it requires only that an
"otherwise qualified handicapped individual" not be excluded
from participation in a federally funded program "solely by rea-
son of his handicap," indicating only that mere possession of a
handicap is not a permissible ground for assuming an inability to
function in a particular context.'0 9
The Court then considered the second aspect of the "otherwise
qualified" requirement. Relying on the existence of probable dan-
gers to others, the court concluded that Davis was not otherwise
qualified to be a nurse because "the ability to understand speech
without reliance on lipreading is necessary for patient safety dur-
ing the clinical phase of the program."110
Southeastern cast doubt on the argument of the United States
Department of Justice that discrimination against people with
AIDS-related disorders, based on irrational fears of contagion, is
not acceptable because it does not result "solely by reason of hand-
108. Southeastern, 442 U.S. at 412-13. Department of Health and Human Services regu-
lations reflect the balance struck by the Supreme Court in Southeastern and define a "qual-
ified handicapped person," in the context of employment, as one who, "with reasonable ac-
commodation, can perform the essential functions of the job in question." See 45 C.F.R. §
84.3 (k)(1)(1985).
109. Southeastern, 442 U.S. at 405.
110. Id. at 407. The Court quoted from the district court findings that:
[I]n many situations such as an operation room intensive care unit, or post-natal
care unit, all doctors and nurses wear surgical masks which would make lip read-
ing impossible. Additionally, in many situations a Registered Nurse would be re-
quired to instantly follow the physician's instructions concerning procurement of
various types of instruments and drugs where the physician would be unable to
get the nurse's attention by other than vocal means .... Of particular concern to
the court in this case is the potential of danger to future patients in such
situations.
Id. at 403.
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icap." First, the risk of contagion should be considered in deter-
mining whether a handicapped individual is "otherwise qualified"
and not as an exception to the "solely by the reason of handicap"
element of section 504. Second, the determination that contagion
makes a person not "otherwise qualified" must be based on medi-
cal facts and scientific knowledge-not on irrational fears regard-
less of how sincerely they are held.
People with AIDS who are discriminated against by recipients of
federal assistance should be able to obtain redress for such dis-
crimination under section 504. They are "handicapped individu-
als" who are discriminated against "solely by reason of handicap."
It may well be that a person with AIDS is not "otherwise quali-
fied" to perform a particular job because of his heightened suscep-
tibility to disease, excessive absences, or physical incapacity due to
the ravages of the disorder itself. However, since the great weight
of medical and scientific evidence suggests that AIDS is communi-
cated to another only through the intravenous transfer of blood or
blood products or through sexual contact,"' it is likely that fears
about the risk of contagion will never immunize discrimination
that is otherwise actionable under section 504.
People with ARC also should be protected under the Rehabilita-
tion Act since the risk of contagion presented by such people is as
small as it is for people with AIDS. Furthermore, since the physi-
cal impact of ARC is less severe than that of AIDS, it is even less
likely that people with ARC would be rendered not "otherwise
qualified" due to a heightened susceptibility to illness. A similar
result should follow with respect to people who test seropositive
since they also present no greater risk of contagion. Furthermore,
since those people manifest no symptoms of the disorder, they
should manifest no heightened susceptibility to disease, illnesses or
physical incapacity that would render them not "otherwise
qualified."'
Analysis of the Act establishes that it can be properly extended
to protect people with AIDS-related disorders. This analysis is
supported by an examination of the Supreme Court's decision last
term in School Board v. Arline. 12
111. See Sande, supra note 16, at 380.
112. 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
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IV. THE Arline CASE
Mrs. Arline, a public elementary school teacher, was fired after
her third relapse of tuberculosis, a contagious, communicable dis-
ease' s from which doctors told her she had been cured twenty
113. The infectious agent in tuberculosis, mycobacterium tuberculosis (tubercle bacillus)
is carried on airborne droplets which are produced when persons with pulmonary tuberculo-
sis in and around their lungs sneeze, cough, or speak. Brief for American Medical Associa-
tion as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4, School Board v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123
[hereinafter Brief for AMA] (on file, Florida State University Law Review). See also AMERI-
CAN THORACIC SOCIETY, DIAGNOSTIC STANDARDS AND CLASSIFICATION OF TUBERCULOSIS AND
OTHER MYCOBACTERIAL DISEASES (14th ed., 1974) (on file, Florida State University Law Re-
view); Harrison, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 625-33 (Braunwald, Isselbacher, Peter-
sdorf, Wilson, Martin & Fauci, Eds., 11th ed. 1987); Merck & Co., THE MERCK MANUAL OF
DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 127, (14th ed. 1982). "These droplets dry out and become small
flecks, called 'droplet nuclei,' which are light enough to remain floating in the air." Brief for
the American Public Health Association, American Civil Liberties Union, American Nurses
Association, and National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems as Amicus Cu-
riae at 6, School Board v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123 [hereinafter Brief for APHA] (on file,
Florida State University Law Review).
"The typical setting for infection is a closed room with poor ventilation. If the germs float
out into the sunlight, they are quickly killed." Brief for APHA at 6 (quoting U.S. Pub.
Health Serv., Centers for Disease Control, TUBERCULOSIS (undated) [hereinafter TUBERCULO-
SIS]. Although the body has many natural traps to filter out foreign elements such as the
droplet nuclei, a person may become infected if the droplet nuclei ride the air deep into the
lungs without being stopped. The newly infected host may not contract the disease
tuberculosis.
Millions of Americans have tuberculosis infection, many of them infected years
ago when the disease was more common. But only a small percentage of those
infected develop the disease; only those with the disease can suffer any impair-
ment (not all do); and only those with the disease in or around the lungs and can
transmit the infection to other people, because only they can exhale tuberculosis
bacteria.
Brief for AMA at 5. As the United States Centers for Disease Control has observed:
Though tubercle bacilli begin to multiply and spread, the body sets up a de-
fense. Usually the defense is sufficient to stop the growth of the germs and further
progression of the disease is halted for the rest of the person's life. This is possible
because the germ will hibernate without ever causing disease, and the damage
done seldom has any effect on the person's physical well-being. Sometimes,
though, disease develops soon after a person becomes infected. This does not oc-
cur often, so the greatest danger is the long-term threat of tuberculosis infection.
Infection from years earlier may progress to disease during periods of stress
caused by other illnesses or physical or emotional hardship, but often for no ap-
parent reason. When the disease develops, the infection can be spread to others.
Brief for APHA at 7 (quoting TUBERCULOSIS).
The initial symptoms of tuberculosis are usually loss of weight and strength, irregular
appetite, and low grade fever. But as the disease progresses and becomes communicable, any
or all of the following may develop: cough, thick mucus brought up from the lungs, blood-
streaked sputum, chest pains, and breathing difficulties. Untreated, the disease may become
debilitating, and in the past, tuberculosis was known as the "white plague" because it killed
so many people. Even today tuberculosis can be deadly. Brief for APHA at 7-8. Of the
28,521 cases of tuberculosis reported in 1978 for the United States, 2,914 resulted in death.
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years previously."" She sued the school board in the District Court
for the Middle District of Florida, alleging that susceptibility to
tuberculosis was a handicap within the meaning of the Rehabilita-
tion Act,115 and that the school board violated section 504 of the
Act in dismissing her even though she was "otherwise qualified."'""
The district court held, first, that Mrs. Arline was not handicapped
under the Act.11 7 Second, the district court said that, " 'even as-
suming' that a person with a contagious disease could be deemed a
And in 1982, the most recent year for which statistics are available, there were 25,520 cases
of tuberculosis resulting in 1,807 deaths. Brief for AMA at 4 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES., TUBERCULOSIS IN THE UNITED STATES 1982)). Today, death results, in
general, because: (1) the disease is diagnosed late in its development; (2) the person with
tuberculosis has other illnesses or medical complications; or (3) the person with tuberculosis
fails regularly to take appropriate medication. Brief for AMA at 4 (citing Davis, Carpenter,
McAllister, Matthew, Bush & Ognibene, Tuberculosis: Cause of Death in Antibiotic Era, 88
CHEST 726 (1985)).
114. Mrs. Arline contracted tuberculosis in 1957 when she was fourteen. Brief for Re-
spondent at 2, in School Bd. v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123 [hereinafter Brief for Respondent]
(copy of an early version of the brief, dated Sept. 18, 1986, on file, Florida State University
Law Review). There are two medical tests used to determine whether a person infected with
the tuberculosis germ is contagious. The classic method of diagnosis is by culturing the bac-
terium, which takes several weeks. The other method of diagnosing infection is by micro-
scopic examination of a stained sputum smear to detect the number of bacilli present. Fol-
lowing the positive test in 1977, Mrs. Arline took sick leave from her teaching job, was
successfully treated, and then returned to her classes. Id. at 2. However, in March of 1978,
she again tested positive. When a November 1978 sputum test again showed positive results,
Mrs. Arline was first placed on leave and then fired, not because she had done anything
wrong, but because of the continued recurrence of tuberculosis. Id. at 2-3. See also Arline,
107 S. Ct. at 1125. Today, with treatment, over 90% of people with tuberculosis are relieved
of symptoms and become noncommunicable within days or weeks. American Thoracic Soci-
ety and the United States Centers for Disease Control, Control of Tuberculosis, 128 AM.
REV. RESPIRATORY DISEASE 336, 340 (1983); Lester, Treatment of Tuberculosis, in PULMO-
NARY DISEASES AND DISORDERS 1306-07 (1980). It is possible that Mrs. Arline is among the
10% of tuberculosis patients who cannot successfully be treated. It is also possible that she
suffered her relapses because she failed regularly to take appropriate medication. Glassroth,
Robins & Snider, Tuberculosis in the 1980's, 302 N. ENG. J. MED. 1441, 1446 (1980).
115. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 357 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96 (1982)).
116. Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1125. Mrs. Arline initially took an administrative appeal of her
dismissal. Id. The Florida State Board of Education, which consists of the Governor and the
Members of the Cabinet, adopted the findings of the hearing officer, rejected the school
board's termination order, and orderd Mrs. Arline's reinstatement with back pay. Brief for
Respondent, supra note 111, at 7. The school board then appealed to the state's First Dis-
trict Court of Appeal which reversed the reinstatement order. Id. Suit was then filed in
federal court.
117. "The District Court held, however, that although there was '[n]o question that she
[Arline] suffers a handicap,' Arline was nevertheless not 'a handicapped person under the
terms of that statute.' (citation omitted) The court found it 'difficult ... to conceive that
Congress intended contagious diseases to be included with the definition of a handicapped
person.'" 107 S. Ct. at 1125 (citation omitted).
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handicapped person, Mrs. Arline was not 'qualified' to teach ele-
mentary school." 1 8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit re-
versed the district court and held that "'persons with contagious
diseases are within the coverage of section 504, and that Mrs. Ar-
line's condition falls.., neatly within the statutory and regulatory
framework of the Act."" 9 The Eleventh Circuit Court remanded
the case for the trial court to determine whether the risks of infec-
tion precluded Mrs. Arline from being "otherwise qualified" for
her job and, if so, whether it was possible to make some reasonable
accommodation for her in that teaching position or in some other
position. The Supreme Court granted Mrs. Arline's motion to pro-
ceed in forma pauperis when the school board petitioned for a writ
of certiorari to challenge the Eleventh Circuit Court's decision.1 20
The Supreme Court made three holdings in Arline. First, after
emphasizing the broad scope accorded to the Act, it held that the
contagious infectious disease of tuberculosis constituted a handi-
cap and that Arline was a "handicapped individual" within the
meaning of section 504.121 Second, the risk of contagion should be
considered in determining whether a "handicapped individual" is
"otherwise qualified"-not as an exception to the "solely by reason
of handicap" element of section 504. Third, it emphasized that
since one of Congress' goals in the Act was to prohibit discrimina-
tion based on unreasonable fears and concerns, exclusion from par-
ticipation in, or denial of benefits to, or discrimination against,
those who have contagious diseases, is permissible only to the ex-
tent that it is based on medical knowledge and scientific fact. Each
of these issues shall be examined in turn.
First, the Supreme Court discussed Congressional expansion in
1974 of the definition of "handicapped individual" to include not
only those with physical and mental impairments, but also those
with either a record of impairment or those who are perceived as
suffering from an impairment. The Court said that the action re-
flected congressional "concern with protecting the handicapped
against discrimination stemming not only from simple prejudice,
but from 'archaic attitudes and laws' and from the fact that the
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. School Bd. v. Arline, 106 S. Ct. 1633 (1986).
121. Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1127-28.
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American people are simply unfamiliar with and insensitive to the
difficulties confront[ing] individuals with handicaps." '2 2
Second, the Court said that Congress was as concerned about the
effect of an impairment on others as it was about its effect on the
individual. It was for this reason that Congress extended coverage
in the Act to those who are simply regarded as having a physical or
mental impairment.
23
Allowing discrimination based on the contagious effects of a phys-
ical impairment would be inconsistent with the basic purpose of
section 504, which is to ensure that handicapped individuals are
not denied jobs or other benefits because of the prejudiced atti-
tudes or the ignorance of others. By amending the definition of
'handicapped individual' to include not only those who are actu-
ally physically impaired, but also those who are regarded as im-
paired and who, as a result, are substantially limited in a major
life activity, Congress acknowledged that society's accumulated
myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping
as are the physical limitations that flow from actual
impairment.1
24
Accordingly, the Court found that:
The Act is carefully structured to replace such reflexive reac-
tions to actual or perceived handicaps with actions based on rea-
soned and medically sound judgments: the definition of 'handi-
capped individual' is broad, but only those individuals who are
both handicapped and otherwise qualified are eligible for relief.
The fact that some persons who have contagious diseases may
pose a serious health threat to others under certain circumstances
does not justify excluding from the coverage of the Act all per-
sons with actual or perceived contagious diseases. Such exclusion
would mean that those accused of being contagious would never
have the opportunity to have their condition evaluated in light of
medical evidence and a determination made as to whether they
were 'otherwise qualified.' Rather, they would be vulnerable to
discrimination on the basis of mythology-precisely the type of
injury Congress sought to prevent. 25
122. Id. at 1126.
123. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B)(iii) (1982).
124. Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1129. It is also appropriate for the Court to extend the protec-
tion of section 504 to those who are unreasonably regarded as being a health risk as Con-
gress itself was aware of the discrimination suffered by epileptics and cancer patients based
on irrational fears of contagion. Id. at 1129 n.13.
125. Id. at 1129-30 (emphasis in original).
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Immunizing discrimination based on an unreasonable fear of con-
tagion would gut the Act by removing the focus from whether the
person who has, had, or is perceived as having a handicap was ac-
tually "otherwise qualified" to perform the job.'
Although tuberculosis is a different infectious contagious disease
from AIDS-related disorders, and although the Court in Arline
specifically declined to apply its analysis to people who carry AIDS
without physical or mental impairment, Arline is crucial to those
who seek to redress discrimination against people with AIDS-re-
lated disorders. The Court discussed AIDS as follows:
The United States argues that it is possible for a person to be
simply a carrier of a disease, that is, to be capable of spreading a
disease without having a 'physical impairment' or suffering from
any other symptoms associated with the disease. The United
States contends that this [is] true in the case of some carriers of
the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) virus. From
this premise the United States concludes that discrimination
solely on the basis of contagiousness is never discrimination on
the basis of handicap. The argument is misplaced in this case,
because the handicap here, tuberculosis, gave rise both to a physi-
cal impairment and to contagiousness. This case does not present,
and we therefore do not reach, the questions whether a carrier of
a contagious disease such as AIDS could be considered to have a
physical impairment, or whether such a person could be consid-
ered, solely on the basis of contagiousness, a handicapped person
as defined by the Act.'27
Three points are worth noting. First, because Arline held that at
least one contagious infectious disease came within the protection
extended by the Act, the door is opened to the possibility that
other contagious infectious diseases, such as AIDS-related disor-
ders, will be similarly protected. Second, because Arline held that
the risk of contagion from tuberculosis should be considered as
part of the "otherwise qualified" element of section 504 and not as
an exception to the "solely by reason of handicap" element of that
section, it is probable that AIDS-related disorders will be treated
similarly. Third, because Arline held that the determination of
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1128 n.7 (emphasis in original). Since AIDS and ARC give rise both to a
physical impairment and to contagiousness, people with these diseases would only appear to
be protected under section 504. It is only with respect to people who test seropositive that
the protection provided by section 504 becomes problematic.
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whether someone was "otherwise qualified" had to be based on sci-
entific fact and medical knowledge, it is probable that people with
AIDS-related disorders will receive similar treatment, and that the
Department of Justice's view will be rejected in section 504 litiga-
tion. Since the great weight of medical and scientific evidence es-
tablishes that AIDS-related disorders are communicated only
through the intravenous transfer of blood or blood products or in-
timate sexual contact, 128 it is doubtful that discrimination against
people with AIDS-related disorders would ever be justified based
on the casual social contact that occurs in employment, housing or
public accommodations.
This author's analysis of the Rehabilitation Act and his exami-
nation of the Arline decision suggest strongly that a person with
an AIDS-related disorder would come within the protection of sec-
tion 504. Nevertheless, advocates for people with an AIDS-related
disorder should consider alternative remedies to redress
discrimination.
V. OTHER FEDERAL STATUTES AVAILABLE TO REDRESS
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH AIDS-RELATED DISORDERS
A. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975
(EAHCA)
One federal action that may be of assistance to people with
AIDS-related disorders is the Education for All Handicapped Chil-
dren Act of 1975 (EAHCA).129 EAHCA applies to children between
the ages of five and eighteen who attend public schools and may,
depending on the law of a particular state, extend both to pre-
school educational programs and to secondary and post-secondary
programs provided to adults under the age of twenty-one. 130 Unlike
the Rehabilitation Act which prohibits recipients of federal funds
from discriminating on the basis of handicap, EAHCA contains an
128. See Sande, supra note 16, at 380.
129. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 774 (1975), and amendments (codified within 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1401-1461 (1982 and Supp. 1985)) [hereinafter EAHCA]. See Bodine, Opening the
Schoolhouse Door for Children with AIDS: The Education for All Handicapped Children
Act, 13 B.C. ENVIR. AFF. L. REV. 583 (1986) (supporting the position that EAHCA is availa-
ble to children with AIDS). But see Note, Protecting Children with AIDS Against Arbi-
trary Exclusion from School, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1373 (1986) (suggesting that EAHCA is inap-
propriate to protect people with AIDS-related disorders from discrimination).
130. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. 1985).
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affirmative mandate to provide support services pending the out-
come of administrative challenges to discriminatory practices.131
The initial hurdle faced by those who seek protection under
EAHCA is the absence of express congressional intent to include
people suffering from contagious communicable diseases. However,
examination of EAHCA's language reveals that it is sufficiently
broad to include them. EAHCA defines "handicapped children" as:
"[m]entally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visu-
ally handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically
impaired, or other health impaired children, or children with spe-
cific learning disabilities, who by reason thereof require special ed-
ucation and related services."' 1 2
Children with AIDS come within the category of "other health
impaired children" and qualify as "handicapped children" under
EAHCA. Regulations of the Office of Special Education and Reha-
bilitative Services of the Department of Education (DOE), specifi-
cally include within the class of "other health impaired children"
those who have tuberculosis. 33
131. First a state must implement a policy assuring equal education for handicapped
children and must submit a plan of compliance to the Secretary of Education which in-
cludes, among other things, a timetable for implementation of notice requirements to inter-
ested parties and the general public prior to amendment of the plan of compliance. 20
U.S.C. § 1412(1),(2)(A),(C) and (E) (1982 & Supp. 1985). Second, a state must establish
priorities for providing educational services by beginning first with those eligible handi-
capped persons who currently receive no education from the state. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(3) (1982
& Supp. 1985). Third, a state must offer special assistance to severely handicapped children
who receive an inadequate education. Id. But most important, a state must establish proce-
dures to assure that:
to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped children, including children in
public or private institutions or other care facilities, are educated with children
who are not handicapped, and that special classes, separate schooling, or other
removal of handicapped children from the regular educational environment occurs
only when the nature of the severity of the handicap is such that education in
regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved
satisfactorily ....
20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1982 & Supp. 1985).
For cases interpreting the purposes of EAHCA, see Rabinowitz v. New Jersey State Bd. of
Educ., 550 F. Supp. 481 (D.N.J. 1982); Lang v. Braintree School Comm., 545 F. Supp. 1221
(D. Mass. 1982); Gladys J. v. Pearland Ind. School Dist., 520 F. Supp. 869 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
For an analysis of 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5), the so-called "Mainstreaming" provision, see Com-
ment, The Least Restrictive Environment Section of the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975: A Legislative History and an Analysis, 13 GONz. L. REV. 717 (1978).
132. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1) (1982 & Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
133. DOE regulations define "other health impaired" children as:
(i) having an autistic condition which is manifested by severe communication and
other developmental and educational problems; or (ii) having limited strength, vi-
tality or alertness, due to chronic or acute health problems such as a heart condi-
tion, tuberculosis, rhematic [sic] fever, nephritis, asthma, sickle cell anemia, he-
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People with ARC would appear to qualify for protection within
EAHCA for similar reasons. However, those who merely test sero-
positive arguably are not handicapped within EAHCA because no
physical manifestation of the disorder's effects is present. EAHCA,
unlike section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, does not include peo-
ple who are perceived to be handicapped. However, it has been
argued that EAHCA is intended to reach health impairments that
stigmatize a child, damage his psychological development, or ad-
versely affect his educational performance. Since discrimination
against children who test seropositive would produce this effect,
they should be protected under EAHCA.134
Most discrimination faced by AIDS-handicapped children in-
volves the irrational belief that they present an unreasonable risk
of contagion to others.135 EAHCA may help children with AIDS-
related disorders who face efforts to segregate them in the class-
room or to exclude them from the classroom. EAHCA requires
states to cooperate with the handicapped child and his or her par-
ents in preparing an "individualized education plan" for the
child.' 36 The state also must provide an appeal mechanism that al-
lows the child and his or her parents to challenge any classification
or change under the "individualized education plan.' ' 3 7 An "indi-
vidualized education plan" that mandates the maximum feasible
integration into the normal educational program should be drafted
as soon as practicable following discovery that the child has an
AIDS-related disorder. Two benefits are produced thereby. First,
the creation of an "individualized education plan" creates an enti-
tlement for the child. The school board would have to prove the
validity of its reasons for changing the "individualized educational
plan" that would segregate the child within the classroom or result
in his dismissal. 38 Second, the status quo is preserved during the
appeal process to protect the child. 39
When material changes in the individual plan are proposed, or
when a complaint is lodged, the appeal process is activated. 40 In-
mophilia, epilepsy, lead poisoning, leukemia or diabetes, which adversely affects a
child's educational performance.
34 C.F.R. § 300.5(b)(7) (1986) (emphasis supplied).
134. Bodine, supra note 129, at 616-18.
135. Id. at 583-86.
136. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(5),(7), and 1413 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
137. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
138. Id. §§ 1413-15.
139. Id. § 1415(e)(3).
140. Id. § 1415(b).
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cluded within the appeals procedure is the right to an impartial
hearing before a neutral examiner; " 1 the right to representation by
counsel and experts; " 2 the right to subpoena, and to confront and
cross-examine witnesses;14 3 the right to a written transcript or elec-
tronic recording of the hearing;1" ' and the right to written findings
of fact and a decision as a basis for any subsequent appeal. 145 Ap-
peals from this process are taken to the state educational agency
review officer who must decide the matter based on an indepen-
dent review of the facts. '4 Following review by the state agency, a
party may bring a civil action in either state147 or federal court.14 8
EAHCA's mandate during the pendency of any appeal is partic-
ularly important to children with AIDS-related disorders. Since
"almost every AIDS patient diagnosed as having an opportunistic
infection dies within four years, 1' 49 and since litigation often is
protracted, the aggrieved child who suffers AIDS-related segrega-
tion might die before he or she could get the courts to remedy irra-
tional and unlawful conduct. Furthermore, the administrative
scheme provided by EAHCA often will free the child with an
AIDS-related disorder from expensive, protracted litigation.' 50
B. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
Another federal action that may be of assistance to victims of
AIDS-related discrimination is the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).' 5 ' ERISA is a comprehensive law
intended to protect the interest of participants' 52 and benefi-
141. Id. § 1415(b)(2).
142. Id. § 1415(d)(1).
143. Id. § 1415(d)(2).
144. Id. § 1415(d)(3).
145. Id. § 1415(d)(4).
146. Id. § 1415(c).
147. Id. § 1415(e)(2).
148. Id. § 1415(e)(4).
149. Laurence, The Immune System in AIDS, Sc. AM., Dec. 1985, at 93. See generally
Bodine, supra note 129, at 587.
150. Bodine, supra note 129, at 613-14.
151. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 and in scat-
tered sections of the Internal Revenue Service Code (1982 & Supp. 1985)).
152. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(B)(7) (1982) defines participant as:
any employee or former employee of an employer, or any member or former mem-
ber of an employee organization, who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit
of any type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of such em-
ployers or members of such organization, or whose beneficiaries may be eligible to
receive any such benefit.
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ciaries 153 in employment benefit plans. '5  This is accomplished
through the disclosure and reporting to participants and benefi-
ciaries of financial and other information about such plans, and
through the establishment of standards of conduct, responsibility,
and obligation for fiduciaries of such plans. 155 Two ERISA sections
relevant to people with AIDS-related disorders are sections 502156
and 510.157
Section 502 allows a participant or beneficiary to bring a civil
action to recover benefits due under the terms of the plan. 158 It
also allows him to enforce or to clarify rights benefits under the
terms of the plan. 159 An action also may be brought to enjoin acts
or practices that violate section 502 or the terms of the plan.10
Conversely, an action may be brought to enforce provisions of ei-
ther section 502 or of the plan itself.'1' Thus, to the extent that a
plan participant or beneficiary is treated differently from other
participants with respect to either the amount, terms or conditions
of his benefits under the plan, that person may have a cause of
action under section 502. Ordinarily, a plan participant with an
AIDS-related disorder would have to exhaust adminstrative reme-
dies, or submit the claim to arbitration, either under the terms of
the plan itself,'62 or other applicable federal law. 1 3 But if the par-
ticipant or beneficiary can show that resort to non-judicial forums
would be futile (e.g., because the alternative non-judicial fact
153. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8) (1982) defines beneficiary as "a person designated by a partici-
pant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a
benefit thereunder."
154. 29 U.S.C. § 1101 (1982).
155. Id. § 1001(b).
156. Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1982), "Civil enforcement."
157. Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982), "Interference with protected rights."
158. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1982).
159. Id.
160. Id. § 1132 (a)(3).
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Jenkens v. Local 705 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Pension Plan, 713 F.2d 247
(7th Cir. 1983); Cowden v. Montgomery County Soc'y for Cancer Control, 591 F. Supp. 740
(S.D. Ohio 1984); Weeks v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 491 F. Supp. 1312 (E.D. Ark. 1980);
Scheider v. United States Steel Corp., 486 F. Supp. 211 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Sample v. Mon-
santo Co., 485 F. Supp. 1018 (E.D. Mo. 1980); Lucas v. Warner & Swasey Co., 475 F. Supp
1071 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Rhodes v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 135 Mich. App. 735, 356 N.W.2d 247
(1984).
163. See, e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 1138
(D.D.C. 1978), af'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 627 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (ERISA does not preempt right of an arbitration panel to resolve a dispute arising out
of application or interpretation of a pension plan set up in a bargaining agreement under
the Railway Labor Act.).
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finder is biased against claims raised by people with AIDS-related
disorders), resort to the judicial remedy may be pursued
directly.'"
In addition to ERISA's section 504, section 510 might help peo-
ple with AIDS-related disorders. Section 510 provides, in relevant
part, that, "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine,
suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or
beneficiary ... for the purpose of interfering with the attainment
of any right to which such participant may become entitled under
the plan . . . .165 Terminating an employee to prevent vesting of
pension or other benefits is prohibited.1 6 6 It appears that sections
of the National Labor Relations Act,16 7 which protect employees
who engage in concerted activities for mutual aid, would protect
employees from discriminatory conduct that is also subject to chal-
lenge under section 510 of ERISA. 16
C. Civil Rights Act of 1871
In addition to the foregoing statutes, consideration should be
given to filing suit under the Civil Rights Act of 1871.169 This stat-
164. See Lieske v. Morlock, 570 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. I11. 1983); Scheider v. United States
Steel Corp., 486 F. Supp. 211 (W.D. Pa. 1980). Federal courts have jurisdiction without
regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(f)
(1982 & 1985 Supp.). Venue is proper either in the district where the plan is administered,
where the alleged breach occured, where a defendant resides, or where a defendant may be
found. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (1982 & 1985 Supp.). Significantly, a court in its discretion
may award a reasonable attorney's fee and the cost of the suit to a prevailing participatant
or beneficiary. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) (1982 & 1985 Supp.).
Nevertheless, ERISA has limited procedures and remedies, and there is no right to a jury
trial. Hollenbeck v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 605 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Mo.), aff'd, 780 F.2d 21
(8th Cir. 1985). Damages generally are limited. Massachussetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell,
473 U.S. 134 (1985). In Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 107 S. Ct. 1549 (1987), the Court
foreclosed the option of filing state court lawsuits against insurers who provide long-term
disability insurance through employers. According to Alice Philipson, a Berkeley, California,
attorney specializing in AIDS law, and co-chair of the Bay Area Lawyers for Individual
Freedom (BALIF) AIDS Panel, the consequences of Pilot Life are two-fold. First, elimina-
tion of the threat of punitive damages under state law will make it advantageous for insur-
ers to "stonewall" claims. Second, these cases will no longer be economically viable for
lawyers.
165. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982).
166. Id. See Kross v. Western Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1241-42 (7th Cir 1983). See also
Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
167. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1) (1982).
168. Leonard, AIDS and Employment Law Revisited, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 11, 37-42
(1986). See also Leonard, Employment Discrimination Against Persons With AIDS, 10
DAYTON U.L. REv. 681, 698-99 (1985).
169. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
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ute empowers a person to sue those who, under color or authority
of any state statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, violate rights
guaranteed to such person under either the Constitution or federal
statute.170 It is immaterial that the statute violated was not di-
rected to guaranteeing equal rights.' 7 ' Furthermore, a prevailing
plaintiff may obtain attorneys fees. 1 2
VI. CIVIL ACTIONS UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Consideration should be given to filing suit under the United
States Constitution to redress discrimination against people with
AIDS-related disorders. The equal protection and due process
clauses of the fourteenth amendment conceivably would reach ac-
tions of the state and those who act under its authority. A substan-
tive due process claim might be filed under the fourteenth amend-
ment. Similar actions also might be filed against the United States
under the fifth amendment. Each of these possibilities is consid-
ered in turn.
A. Equal Protection Under the Fourteenth Amendment
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution provides that no state shall "deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.' 173 Social or economic legislation is presumed to be valid and
will be sustained if the classification drawn is rationally related to
a legitimate state interest.' 7' This is the so-called "rational basis"
test employed in equal protection analysis. States are given wide
leeway in these areas because the Constitution presumes that even
improvident decisions eventually will be rectified by the demo-
170. Id.
171. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). Cf. Chapman v,. Houston Welfare
Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979) (28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), the jurisdictional statute for 28 U.S.C.
§ 1983, was not limited to statutues providing for equal rights).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
173. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
174. See, e.g., Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1958) (challenge
to imposition of Ohio ad valorem tax on non-resident's contents of warehouse); Williamson
v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 486-91 (1955) (challenge to Oklahoma Law subjecting opticians
to a regulatory scheme for the dispensing of eyeglasses while exempting sellers of ready-to-
wear eyeglasses); American Fed'n of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538,
541-42 (1949) (challenging right-to-work amendment to Arizona constitution). See also
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297,
303 (1976).
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cratic process.'" By contrast, legislative classifications of "suspect
classes" based on race, alienage or national origin are subject to
"strict scrutiny" analysis because classification on those bases are
seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state inter-
est.1 76 It can be presumed that such classifications reflect prejudice
and antipathy-a view that says that those in the burdened class
are not as worthy or deserving as others.7 7 Although this dichot-
omy in equal protection analysis has been criticized, and sugges-
tions for "intermediate scrutiny" regarding "quasi-suspect" classes
have been set forth,17 8 the dichotomy remains.1 9
Certain Supreme Court decisions make it unlikely that people
with AIDS-related disorders would be able to use the equal protec-
tion clause to reach conduct that would not be reached under the
Rehabilitation Act, EAHCA, or ERISA. First, in City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 80 the Court refused to apply in-
termediate scrutiny to the mentally retarded. Since the mentally
retarded historically have been subjected to discrimination,' 8 ' and
there is no suggestion that such discrimination is qualitatively dif-
ferent from that suffered by people with AIDS-related disorders, it
is unlikely that people with AIDS will receive more favorable treat-
ment from the Court. Furthermore, the Court relied on the Reha-
bilitation Act and other remedial statutes to argue that the men-
tally retarded are not "politically powerless in the sense that they
have no ability to attract the attention of the lawmakers," and
therefore, legislation affecting them need not be subjected to strict
scrutiny analysis under the equal protection clause.'"" A similar ar-
gument could be applied to people with AIDS-related disorders
175. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 440-41. Furthermore, because these "discrete and insular minorities," United
States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-54 n.4 (1938), are seldom able to use the
democratic process to rectify invidious discrimination, legislative classifications on such ba-
ses will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
178. See, e.g., City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 432; San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, J.) (criticizing
"the Court's rigidified approach to equal protection analysis"). It appears that at least in
some instances, the Court will apply "intermediate scrutiny" to require "that legislation
burdening certain 'quasi-suspect' classes or impairing important, but not fundamental,
rights be substantially related to an important state interest." Note, The Constitutional
Rights of AIDS Carriers, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1274, 1278 (1986).
179. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-42.
180. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
181. Id. at 461 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
182. Id. at 443-45.
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who also have been able to redress some of the discrimination
against them under state law.' 83
In addition, it is abundantly clear that not all people with an
AIDS-related disorder are gay men, although gay men comprise
the largest group of people with AIDS-related disorders. 18 Accord-
ingly, to the extent that legislative classifications based on sexual
orientation do not compel any closer scrutiny than the rational ba-
sis test, any argument for heightened scrutiny for AIDS-related
discrimination is likely to fail. The chance of getting a court to
apply a heightened scruitiny standard was undercut by the Su-
preme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,'85 which categori-
cally denies constitutional protection to acts of consensual homo-
sexual sodomy. First, the Court held that a Georgia sodomy
statute""0 did not violate the fundamental rights of homosexuals.187
Second, it held that the Constitution does not confer a fundamen-
tal right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy. Third, it held
that the presumed belief of Georgia that homosexual sodomy was
immoral and unacceptable provided a rational basis for Georgia's
sodomy statute.
It could be argued that the interest of people with AIDS-related
disorders to live as normal an existence as possible is so fundamen-
tal that it necessitates application of a heightened scrutiny stan-
dard. However, it is unlikely that this argument would succeed in
light of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.188
There, the plaintiff class-consisting of children residing in poor
school districts with a low property tax base-claimed that the
Texas educational funding scheme based on local property taxes
183. Id. at 445. See, e.g., Employment Discrimination Based on AIDS Ruled Unlawful
in California, 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) (Empl. Prac. Dec.) T 5047 (1987); Commission
Declares that AIDS Fits Definition of Physical Handicap, 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH)
(Empl. Prac. Dec.) 5044 (1986) (Colorado); AIDS-Based Discrimination Prohibited by the
D.C. Human Rights Act, 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) (Empl. Prac. Dec.) 5046 (1986);
AIDS Constitutes a Physical Handicap Under Maine's Human Rights Act, 2 Empl. Prac.
Guide (CCH) (Empl. Prac. Dec.) 5023 (1986); AIDS is a Handicap Under the Michigan
Handicappers' Act, 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) (Empl. Prac. Dec.) 5042 (1986); Employ-
ment Discrimination Based on AIDS Prohibited, Oregon Commissioner States, 2 Empl.
Prac. Guide (CCH) (Empl. Prac. Dec.) $ 5020 (1986).
184. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
185. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
186. Interestingly, the Georgia sodomy statute is not limited to homosexuals. "A person
commits the offense of sodomy when he [sic] performs or submits to any sexual act involv-
ing the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another." GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-6-2
(1984) (quoted in Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2842 n.1).
187. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2843.
188. 411 U:S. 1 (1972).
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violated the equal protection clause because it favored the affluent,
resulting in substantial interdistrict disparities in per-pupil ex-
penditures due to the disparity in property values among the dis-
tricts. However, the Court held that education was not a funda-
mental right under the Constitution, applying the "rational basis"
instead of the "strict scrutiny" test, to salvage the Texas funding
scheme.
Cleburne involved the right of the mentally retarded to reside in
a group home so that they could live outside of an institution.
Since the Court refused to recognize that interest as fundamental,
it is unlikely that people with AIDS-related disorders will receive
different treatment when they use the equal protection clause to
fight discrimination.
B. Procedural Due Process
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution provides that no state shall "deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law."' 189 Procedurally, the due process clause provides that where
the power of government is used against an individual so as to de-
prive him of his interest in "life," "liberty," or "property," there is
a right to fair procedures to determine the basis for and the legal-
ity of such action.190 No due process right is due, constitutionally,
unless the interest falls within those categories.' 9'
Presently there are no indications that the government is con-
templating action that would impact on the "life" interest of peo-
ple with an AIDS-related disorder. Therefore, this Article shall fo-
cus on only the "liberty" and "property" interests. The "liberty"
interest appears to be implicated whenever the government takes
action which is designed to deprive an individual of the freedom to
engage in some significant area of human activity. 92 The most
likely areas of conflict with respect to the "liberty" interest for
people with AIDS-related disorders involve the termination or
modification of professional licenses granted by the state, limits on
189. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
190. See, e.g., Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972).
191. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710-12 (1976) (There was no state violation of the due
process clause when a photograph of Davis bearing his name was erroneously included on a
"flyer" of "active shoplifters" because damage to his reputation did not affect any "liberty"
or "property" interests).
192. See generally Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405
(1977).
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other important human activities, and quarantine of people with
AIDS-related disorders. Each of these topics is examined in turn.
When a state grants an individual a license to engage in a profes-
sion, it must provide a procedure to determine that person's fitness
should it seek to terminate the license."' 3 Advocates for people
with AIDS-related disorders who are involved in proceedings to
terminate or modify a professional license should insist that any
ruling be based on scientific fact and medical knowledge. 194
The "liberty" interest also is implicated whenever the govern-
ment takes control of an important area of human activity and reg-
ulates who may engage in that activity. Thus, for example, because
the government regulates who may drive an automobile, it must
provide a hearing when it revokes a driver's license.195 Even when
the government has not established a licensing system to regulate
an activity, a hearing must be granted if it revokes a person's privi-
lege to engage in that activity. Therefore, if the government pub-
licly identifies a person as a "drunkard," and, if under state law
such posting forecloses that person's ability to purchase alcoholic
beverages, a hearing first must be held.'
The "liberty" interest also would be implicated were the state to
attempt to quarantine people with AIDS-related disorders. All
states and the District of Columbia have statutes that authorize
the imposition of quarantine. 97 At least one state-Virginia-has
193. See, e.g., In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550, modified, 392 U.S. 919 (1968); Dent v.
West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889). Statutes defining the terms for retaining a professional
license often use specific criteria for license suspension so that they may give an individual a
property interest or "entitlement" in the license. Thus, the New York licensing system for
horse trainers created a property interest in licensed trainers that was protected by the due
process clause. Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 (1979).
194. This approach is similar to that taken by the U.S. Supreme Court in School Board
v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987). See supra notes 111-126 and accompanying text. The ap-
proach also is similar to that taken under the Administrative Procedure Act of Massachu-
setts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, §§ 1-17 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987). The need for such
an approach is illustrated by Cook County Board Votes to Limit Doctor's Privileges, 2
AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 2, at 3 (Feb. 11, 1987), where the Cook County (Ill.) Board of
Commissioners, in a closed session, voted to limit the staff privileges of a male Cook County
Hospital staff physician who had contracted AIDS. This action violated the physicians's
"liberty" interest absent proof that his condition presented a reasonable probability of harm
either to himself or to his patients.
195. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539-40 (1971).
196. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 434-37 (1971).
197. Alabama: ALA. CODE §§ 22-12-4, 12-12-12 (1984); Alaska: ALASKA STAT. §
18.15.136 (1986) (tuberculosis); Arizona: ARMz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-714(B)(4) (1986) (tu-
berculosis); Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-612, 62411 (1976) (tuberculosis); California:
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 3195 (West 1979); Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-1-623
(1982); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-26 (West 1986); Delaware: DEL. CODE
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planned a quarantine program to isolate AIDS patients who con-
tinue to have sexual relations.""8 The possible impact of state quar-
antine statutes on people with AIDS-related disorders has been ad-
dressed extensively by legal commentators.9 9 Attempts by any
state to quarantine any person with an AIDS-related disorder
should be challenged on the ground that it is overbroad, since all
medical and scientific data establish that AIDS-related disorders
are not transmitted through casual social contact.2 0
ANN. tit. 16, §§ 503, 505 (1983); District of Columbia: D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-119 (1981);
Florida: FLA. STAT. § 384.28 (Supp. 1986) (sexually transmissible disease); Georgia: GA.
CODE ANN. § 31-12-4 (1982); Hawaii: HAW. REV. STAT. § 325-8 (1985); Idaho: IDAHO CODE §
39-603 (1985) (venereal disease); Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 ', para. 22 (Smith-Hurd
1977); Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 16-1-3-7 (Burns 1983); Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. § 139.3
(West 1972); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-126 (1985); Kentucky: Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
214-020 (Baldwin 1982); Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:5 (West 1977); Maine: ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 454 (1980); Maryland: MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 18-324
(1982 & Supp. 1986) (tuberculosis); Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, §§ 92-
98 (West 1983) (isolation hospitals and tuberculosis treatment centers); Michigan: MICH.
COMp. LAWS ANN. § 333.2251 (West 1980); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.05 (West
1970); Mississippi: Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-23-5 (Supp. 1986); Montana: MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 50-2-116(1985); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. § 439.210 (1979); New Hampshire: N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 141-C:11 (Supp. 1985); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:4-2 (West 1987);
New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-1-3,15 (1978); New York: N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §
2100 (McKinney 1985); North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-145 (1986); North Da-
kota: N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-07-06 (1978); Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.56 (Anderson
1980); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-504 (West 1984); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. §
433.106 (1983); Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 521.7, 16 (Purdon 1977); Rhode
Island: RI. GEN. LAWS § 23-8-4 (1985); South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-1-80 (Law
Co-op 1985); South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 34-22-3,4 (1986); Tennessee:
TENN. REV. CODE ANN, § 68-5-104 (1983); Texas: TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4419b-4.01
(Vernon Supp. 1987); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-6-4 (1984); Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 1004a (1982); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-43 (1985); Washington: WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 43.20.050 (Supp. 1987); West Virginia: W. VA. CODE § 16-3-1 (1985); Wis-
consin: WIs. STAT. ANN. § 143.05 (West 1974 & Supp. 1986); Wyoming: Wvo. STAT. § 35-4-
103 (1977). See also Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 192-020, 320 (Vernon 1983); Nebraska:
NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-502 (1986).
Because many quarantine laws have not been applied for years to communicable disease
cases, one cannot assume that they have been amended to reflect due process concerns. For
example, in Texas, the Legislature repealed that state's antiquated communicable disease
quarantine law and substituted one that provided for tough procedural due process protec-
tion. THE ADVOCATE, No. 477, at 15 col. 3 (July 21, 1987).
198. See Washington Post, Nov. 9, 1985, at D3, col.1.
199. See, e.g., Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival of an Archaic Doctrine, 14
HOFSTRA L. REV. 53 (1985); Note, The Constitutional Rights of AIDS Carriers, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1274, 1276-79, 1281-84 (1986); Note, Protecting Children with AIDS Against Arbitrary
Exclusion from School, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1373, 1375-81 (1986); Bodine, supra note 129, at
596-602.
200. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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The "property" interest of the due process clause may be impli-
cated in the context of government employment201 or government
benefits to which an individual may be entitled as a matter of state
law.202 Unless an employee has been granted a term of guaranteed
employment, he or she will have no property right to continued
employment in that position.2 03 An exception exists, however, if
the method of termination or the publication of false information
regarding termination might create a stigma or foreclose employ-
ment opportunities thereby affecting a "liberty" interest. 04
C. Substantive Due Process
The doctrine of substantive due process had its genesis in natu-
ral law, but it is also reflected in the Declaration of Independence
and the Constitution.05 It holds that although certain general
rights were ceded to representative government in forming the
Union, others are basic inalienable rights which inure to human
beings and cannot be taken away. 206 Legislation that abridges these
basic rights is void because it deprives the affected people of due
process of law.207
The modern era of substantive due process began with Lochner
v. New York,20 8 and sharply declined with cases such as Nebbia v.
201. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1972).
202. E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970) (welfare benefits); Goss v. Lo-
pez, 419 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1975) (school attendance).
203. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
204. Id. at 572-75. In Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627-28 (1977) (per curiam), the Court
held that the individual was not entitled to a reemployment hearing because he did not
claim that the distributed information was false. It is problematic whether disclosing accu-
rate but potentially devastating information about a person would be actionable. Only Jus-
tice Stevens appears to have ad' anced the position that the employee should have the right
to contest whether the informat on justifies dismissal even if it is true. Id. at 631 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Consequently, disclosure that someone has an AIDS-related disorder may
not be actionable, notwithstanding its impact.
205. E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 10-57 (1980); B. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF
AMERICAN CONSITITUTIONAL LAW 9-45 (1976).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 198 U.S. 45, 52-58 (1905). The case involved a challenge to a New York statute
limiting the number of hours that a baker could work. The Court struck the law as violative
of the fourteenth amendment which the Court said guarantees the liberty to purchase or sell
one's own labor. Id. at 53. The statute could not be sustained as a valid exercise of the
state's police power because there was nothing inherently dangerous in the occupation of a
baker (cf. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (regarding work in mines and smelters)), or
some infirmity in bakers that prevented them from asserting their rights and protecting
their interest without the protecting arm of the state. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57. Furthermore,
the state could not point out any harm that inured in a baker who works in excess of the
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New York20' and West Coast Hotel, Co. v. Parrish.210 In post-
Lochner cases such as United States v. Carolene Products Co.,2 11
the Court has held that such social and economic legislation is to
be sustained by presuming the existence of those facts cited by the
legislature in support thereof unless the presumption totally lacks
any "rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the
legislature. 11 1 2
The efficacy of the argument-that legislation affecting people
with AIDS-related disorders should be subject to a substantive due
process analysis-has been undercut by the Court's general rejec-
tion of the doctrine in the post-Lochner era. Additionally, the
Court has indicated that to the extent that substantive due process
remains available, it has been limited to privacy rights involving
family, marriage and procreation.2 13
D. The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
Whereas the fourteenth amendment of the United States Consti-
tution operates upon the states, the fifth amendment of the United
States Constitution operates upon the federal government." 4 The
fifth amendment's due process clause provides that "[n]o person
shall be .. .deprived of life, liberty or property, without due pro-
cess of law." The clause includes procedural due process and sub-
stantive due process elements,"' and the Supreme Court has held
that the due process clause prohibits the federal government from
denying equal protection of the laws. 21" Accordingly, the discussion
of those topics in the context of the fourteenth amendment is ap-
plicable here and may be incorporated by reference.
limitation. The majority refused to accept the argument that the legislature might rationally
have adopted the legislation to protect the health of the bakers.
209. 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (sustaining a state regulatory scheme for milk).
210. 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (sustaining state-imposed minimum wages for female
employees).
211. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
212. Id. at 152. But see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432
(1985).
213. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2844 (1986).
214. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (fifth amendment applies
only to federal government); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
215. See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
216. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 234 (1979).
19871
268 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:221
VII. STATE STATUTES THAT MAY HELP PEOPLE WITH AIDS-
RELATED DISORDERS
It is difficult to make broad sweeping pronouncements about the
efficacy of state anti-handicap statutes for people with an AIDS-
related disorder.2"7 First, at least one state has no statute that bars
discrimination on the basis of handicap,1 8 and other states limit
the scope of statutory protection to only public employees. 19 Sec-
ond, it appears that fewer than one half of the states with handi-
cap discrimination statutes have had them interpreted in a judicial
decision.22 0 Furthermore, although two states specifically exclude
217. State laws pertaining to employment discrimination are collected in Labor Rela-
tions Reporter, Fair Employment Practices Manual (BNA), Employment Practices Deci-
sions (CCH), and Employment Practices Guide (CCH). Current developments as they affect
people with AIDS-related disorders are collected in AIDS Policy & Law (BNA).
218. At this writing it appears that only Delaware lacks any statute that deals with dis-
crimination against the handicapped. Arizona was in the same category until 1985 when it
added handicap as an unlawful basis for employment discrimination, AMz. REV. STAT. ANN. §
41-1463 (1985). Wyoming was also in this category until 1985 when handicap was added to
that state's Fair Employment Practices Act, Wyo. STAT. § 27-9-105 (Supp. 1987).
219. Alabama: ALA. CODE 21 §§ 21-7-1 to 7-8 (1984); Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. 29 §
82-2901 (Supp. 1985); Idaho: IDAHO CODE §§ 56-701, 707(1) (Supp. 1986); Mississippi:
MIss. CODE ANN. § 43-6-15 (1981); South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-13-1(15)
(Supp. 1986). However, in some of these states, gubernational executive orders or actual
statutes extend the nondiscrimination requirement to programs receiving state financial as-
sistance. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-2901 (Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE § 56-707 (Supp.
1986); Exec. Order No. 78-4, 3 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) (Empl. Prac. Dec.) 22,365 (Oct.
17, 1978) (issued by Idaho governor John V. Evans).
220. See Alaska: Welsh v. Municipality of Anchorage, 676 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1984); Cal-
ifornia: American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 34 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 818 (Cal. 1982); Colorado: Silverstein v. Sisters of Charity, 43 Colo. App. 446,
614 P.2d 891 (1980); Hawaii: E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw.
1980) vacated and remanded sub nom., E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Donovan, 26 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1183 (D. Haw. 1981); Illinois: Kubic v. CNA Fin. Corp., 96 Ill. App. 3d 715,
422 N.E. 2d 1 (1981); Iowa: Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 33 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 34,260 (Iowa 1983); Kansas: High v. Power Flame Div., Inc., 29 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 11 32,866 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982); Massachusetts: Cronan v. New England Tel. Co.,
41 F.E.P. Cases 1273 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1986); Minnesota: Lewis v. Remmele Eng'g Inc.,
314 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1981); New Jersey: Andersen v. Exxon Co., 31 Empl. Prac Dec.
(CCH) $ 33,428 (N.J. 1982); New York: Seitzman v. Hudson River Assoc., 126 A.D.2d 211,
513 N.Y.S.2d 148 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); Oregon: Pacific Motor Trucking Co. v. Bureau of
Labor and Indus., 33 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) T 34,271 (Or. Ct. App. 1983); Pennsylvania:
National R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak) v. Pennsylvania, 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
33,420 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983); Rhode Island: Providence Journal Co. v. Mason, 116 R.I.
614, 359 A.2d 682 (1976); Texas: Carter v. Gulf Oil Co., 699 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Ct. App.
1985); Utah: Salt Lake City Corp. v. Confer, 674 P.2d 632 (Utah 1983); Washington:
Barnes v. Washington Natural Gas Co., 22 Wash. App. 576, 591 P.2d 461 (Wash. Ct. App.
1979); Wisconsin: Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Wisconsin, 90 Wis. 2d 408, 280 N.W. 2d 142 (1979).
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communicable disease as a basis for discrimination,221 at least one
state has interpreted its statute administratively to exclude "tem-
porary" illnesses.2 22 Nevertheless, some general statements can be
made.
Twelve states have handicap discrimination statutes that are
based in whole on the federal Rehabilitation Act. However, only
nine of those states adopt language from the Act to protect people
who have a record of such impairment or are regarded as having
such an impairment. 23 It appears that advocates in those jurisdic-
tions will be in the best position to use the Arline case and the
Rehabilitation Act arguments discussed previously in this Article
to protect people with AIDS-related disorders from discrimina-
tion.2 2 The other three states do not protect people who either
have a "record" of impairment or are "regarded" as having the
same.225 Georgia specifically excludes contagious communicable
diseases from statutory protection.226
Eight states and the District of Columbia have handicap dis-
crimination statutes that, although not identical, have language
that protects from discrimination people who have suffered any
anatomical, physiological or neurological disability, infirmity, mal-
formation, or disfigurement which is caused by injury, birth defect,
or illness.227 People with AIDS and people with ARC would appear
221. Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 34-6A-3(b) (1982); Kentucky: Ky. REV STAT. ANN. §
207.140 (2)(c) (Michie/Bobbs/Merrill 1982).
222. New Hampshire administrative rules define "illness" as a "short term, temporary
medical condition" under N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:3(xiii) (1984). This would appear
not to include AIDS-related disorders since, by their very nature, they are permanent and,
except for seropositive persons, are invariably fatal. N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. HUM 405.01
(1984).
223. See, e.g., Colorado: CoLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-301(4) (1982) (but does not include
mental handicaps); Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2253(2) (West Supp. 1982); Mas-
sachusetts: MAss. GEN LAWS ANN. ch 151B, § 1(17) (West Supp. 1987); Minnesota: MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 363.01(25) (West Supp. 1987); New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-2(k)
(Supp. 1983); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25 § 1301(4) (West. 1987); Oregon: OR.
REV. STAT. § 659.400(2) (1983); Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-6(7) (1986); Ver-
mont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 495d(5) (Supp. 1986).
224. See supra notes 56-125 and accompanying text.
225. Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-2(14) (Supp. 1987); West Virginia: W. VA. CODE §
5-11-3(t) (1987).
226. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-6A-3(b)(1)-(2) (1982).
227. Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.300(11) (1986); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46a-51(15) (West 1986); District of Columbia: D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2502(23)(1981); Illi-
nois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, para. 1-103(I) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); Maine: ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(7-A) (1979); Maryland: MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 15(g) (1986);
Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-101(16) (1985); Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-
1102(8) (1984); New Jersey: N.J. STAT, ANN. § 10:5-5(q) (West Supp. 1987).
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to fall under the statutory definition since they have physical man-
ifestations of the illness. However, there are indications that peo-
ple who merely test seropositive will also find in these statutes pro-
tection from discrimination."' In addition to the eight states
already mentioned, three states contain a similar, albeit truncated,
version of the aforementioned standard and require only a "condi-
tion" which constitutes a substantial disability.2
Another group of states have definitions of handicap that are
unique. Each concerns a medically verifiable health impairment
which requires special services and appears to be reasonably cer-
tain to exist throughout the individual's lifetime. The statutes typ-
ically require that the disease does not interfere with the individ-
ual's job performance or qualifications, while recognizing that the
disease may manifest itself through several possible physical im-
pairments. 30 It appears that people with AIDS or ARC would be
228. See, e.g., D.C. Human Rights Office Plans Policy Statement, 1 AIDS Pol'y & L.
(BNA) No. 2, at 7 (Feb. 12, 1986) ("The provisions of the Human Rights Act regarding
discrimination on the basis of handicap are applicable to discrimination against those suffer-
ing from AIDS as well as those 'regarded' as having the disease, whether correctly or incor-
rectly."). Maine Law Bars Discrimination, Panel Says, 1 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 6, at
6 (Apr. 9, 1986) ("The Maine Human Rights Commission said March 17 that state law
banning handicap discrimination in employment, housing and public accomodations covered
AIDS-based discrimination."). See also AIDS Constitutes a Physical Handicap Under
Maine's Human Rts. Act, 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 5023; Empl. Prac Guide (CCH)
5026 (New Jersey Division of Civil Rights holds that persons with an AIDS-related disorder
are protected under the Law Against Discrimination); see also Refusal to Rent to Gays Said
Barred by State Law, 2 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 6, at 3 (Apr. 8, 1987) ("A New Jersey
judge ruled March 12 that state handicap law bars a landlord's refusal to rent to homosex-
ual because of a fear that the individuals may be at risk of developing AIDS.").
229. Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-1-3(q) (Burns 1986); Iowa: IowA CODE ANN. § 601
A.2(11) (West 1975); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1002()(1986).
230. See generally California: Cal. Gov't Code § 12926(h) (West Supp. 1987); Hawaii:
HAW. REv. STAT. § 378-1 (1985); South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-7-35 (Law Co-op.
1983) (see also 3 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) (Empl. Prac. Dec.) 27,106.06 (1983)); Michi-
gan: MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.1103(b)(i) (West 1985); New York: N.Y. ExEc. LAW §
292(21) (McKinney Supp. 1987); Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4712.01(13) (Anderson 1980);
Texas: TEx. HUMAN RES. CODE ANN. § 121.002(4) (Vernon 1980); Washington: Wash. Ad-
min. Code § 49.60.010 - .030 (Supp. 1987); Wisconsin: WIs. STAT. ANN. § 11.32(8)(a) (West.
Supp. 1984). See also Pennsylvania: 43 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 954 (Purdon Supp. 1987),
which uses the term "non-job related handicap or disability." The statute defines the phrase
as "any handicap or disability which does not substantially interfere with the ability to
perform the essential functions of the employment which a handicapped person applies for,
is engaged in or has been engaged in."
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protected in most of these states.2' A similar result would follow
with respect to people who test seropositive.132
Finally, there is a group of states, including Florida, in which the
applicable state laws relating to handicap discrimination either do
not define "handicap" or define "handicap" only in other stat-
utes.2 33 Administrative3 4 and judicial interpretations indicate that
protection would be provided by these statutes not only to people
with AIDS and ARC, but also to people who test seropositive.
231. California Commission Says Aids Is a Handicap Under State Law, 2 AIDS Pol'y &
L. (BNA) No. 3, at 1 (Feb 25, 1987) ("California's fair housing and employment law covers
persons with AIDS, the state Fair Employment and Housing Commission ruled."); Civil
Rights Agency Rules AIDS Handicap in Michigan, 1 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 17, at 4
(Sept. 10, 1986). See also AIDS Is a Handicap Under the Michigan Handicappers' Act, 2
Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) (Empl. Prac. Dec.) 1 5042; Michigan Judge Terms AIDS a Disa-
bility, 2 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 7, at 6 (Apr. 22, 1987); Pear, States' AIDS Discrimina-
tion Laws Reject Justice Department's Stand, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1986, at A20, col. 1
("[T]he State Commissioner of Human Rights said that discrimination based on AIDS is
prohibited by state law in employment, housing and police accommodations."); Rights Com-
mission Allowed to Proceed with Bias Charge, 2 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 1, at 3 (Jan.
28, 1987) ("A New York State judge ruled Jan. 9 that the New York City Commission on
Human Rights (CHR) may proceed with a complaint against a funeral home that allegedly
discriminated against persons who died of AIDS."); In Brief, 2 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No.
6, at 10 (Apr. 8, 1987) ("The Ohio Civil Rights Commission considers AIDS a handicap...
and it will investigate charges of discrimination 'under the commonly accepted legal stan-
dards which are applied' to other handicaps."); AIDS Is A Handicap Under Philadelphia's
Fair Practices Act, 3 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 1 5027; Broad Anti-Bias Ordinance Ap-
proved by Austin Council, 1 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 25, at 1 (Dec. 31, 1986); AIDS
Rules Drafted by Washington Rights Body, 1 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 13, at 7 (July 16,
1986) ("The Washington State Human Rights Commission has proposed draft guidelines
and policy for preventing discrimination related to AIDS .... AIDS is considered a disabil-
ity under the Washington State Law Against Discrimination."); Challenge to School Policy
Prompts State Action, 1 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 4, at 5 (Mar. 12, 1986) ("[Tlhe (Wis-
consin) state Department of Industrial, Labor, and Human Relations [ruled] that AIDS is a
protected handicap under state law, and that employers who terminate workers with AIDS
or those perceived to have AIDS may be violating state law provisions that prohibit discrim-
ination on the basis of handicap or sexual orientation.").
232. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
233. In Florida, The Human Rights Act of 1977, FLA. STAT. §§ 760.01-760.10 (1977), does
not define "handicap." But the Fair Housing Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 760.20-760.37 (1985), does
define a "handicapped person." See also Nevada: NEv. REv. STAT. § 613, 310 (1986); North
Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-1 (1982); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-17-102(b)
(1984); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. §§ 51.01-3, 51.01-42, 51.01-45 (1986).
234. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Broward County Office of Mgmt. & Budget Policy, Flor-
ida Comm'n on Human Rights Relations, FCHR No. 85-0624, reprinted in 2 Empl. Prac.
Guide (CCH) 5014 ("Based upon the plain meaning of the term 'handicap' and the medi-
cal evidence presented, an individual with [AIDS] is within the coverage of the Human
Rights Act of 1977.").
272 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:221
VIII. LOCAL ORDINANCES MAY HELP PEOPLE WITH AIDS-RELATED
DISORDERS: CALIFORNIA AS AN EXAMPLE
California cities have been in the forefront in enacting ordi-
nances to bar discrimination on the basis of AIDS. Indeed, with
the exception of Austin, Texas, no community outside of California
has barred discrimination against people with AIDS-related disor-
ders.s35 San Francisco, Los Angeles and Berkeley have adopted
such ordinances."3 ' A number of California counties also have
adopted measures to bar discrimination against people with AIDS-
related disorders.137 In light of the broad relief available under the
San Francisco and Los Angeles ordinances, and the difficulty in
getting legislation enacted to declare AIDS a handicap at the state
level, 238 many potential plaintiffs may be encouraged to use the lo-
235. See 5 EMPL. REL. BUL. No. 7, at 7 (March 1987) (Center for Employment Relations
and Law, Florida State Univ. College of Law) ("Austin, Texas approved a broad ordinance
banning AIDS-based discrimination in employment, housing and public accomodations.
Austin is the first city outside California to outlaw AIDS-based discrimination."). Accord,
Broad Anti-Bias Ordinance Approved by Austin Council, I AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 25,
at 1 (Dec. :31, 1986).
236. San Francisco, Cal., Ordinance No. 49985 (to be codified at SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.
MUNICIPAL CODE pt. II, chap. VIII, art. 38, §§ 3801-3816) (reported in 3 Empl. Prac. Guide
(CCH) (Empl. Prac. Dec.) 20,950B (Dec. 20, 1985)). The San Francisco ordinance, for
example, authorizes an aggrieved party to file a request with the city's Human Rights Com-
mission to have it "investigate and mediate his or her complaint under the provisions of the
Administrative Code of the City and County of San Francisco." SAN FRANCISCO, CAL. MUNIC-
IPAL CODE pt. II, chap. VIII, art. 38, § 3811. The ordinance also authorizes an aggrieved
party to file a civil suit for legal or equitable relief without first filing a complaint with the
Human Rights Commission. Id. Actual damages, damages in excess of actual damages up to
and including treble damages, punitive damages where appropriate, costs and attorney's fees
may be obtained. Id. at § 3810. And where liability has been found damages of at least
$1,000 must be imposed. Id.; Los Angeles, Cal. Ordinance No. 160289 (codified as Los ANGE-
LES, CAL.. MUNICIPAL CODE ch. III, art. 5.8, §§ 45.80-45.93 (Aug. 16, 1985)) (reported in 3
Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) (Empl. Prac. Dec.) 20,950A)). The Los Angeles ordinance is
silent with respect to filing complaints with a city human rights commission. However, the
ordinance authorizes an aggrieved party to file a civil action for legal and equitable relief.
Los ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. IIl, art. 5.8, § 45.90. Furthermore, the ordinance
authorizes a court to award a successful plaintiff actual damages, costs, attorney's fees, and
punitive damages in appropriate cases. Id. at § 45.89. See also Berkeley Bars Bias, I AIDS
Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 5, at 6 (Mar. 26, 1986).
237. In Brief, I AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 1, at 7 (Jan. 28, 1987) (Sonoma, San Fran-
sisco, San Mateo, Riverside, and San Luis Obispo counties).
238. Bill That Would Term AIDS Handicap Reconsidered by California Assembly, 1
AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 10, at 1 (June 4, 1986) (the measure failed by one vote); Cali-
fornia Assembly Approves Bill Terming AIDS Handicap, 1 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 11,
at 2 (June 18, 1986); Deukmejian Vetoes Handicap Law as 'Unnecessary' and 'Inappropri-
ate,' 1 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 19, at 1 (Oct. 8, 1986); AIDS Bills Proliferate Before
State Legislature, 2 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 6, at 6 (Apr. 8, 1987) ("The major piece of
legislation, called the AIDS Ommibus Bill (AB 87) ... incorporates a controversial measure
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cal ordinances. Furthermore, advocates for people with AIDS-re-
lated disorders outside of California may be encouraged to seek re-
medial legislation at the local level because of difficulties at the
state level in getting remedial legislation enacted. Accordingly, it is
appropriate to examine these California city ordinances.
The power and duties of local government units in California are
quite broad. 39 Nevertheless, there are indications that the Califor-
nia legislature has occupied the area of discrimination in housing
and employment to the exclusion of any affirmative legislation by
cities and counties. "[Ijt is the intention of the Legislature to oc-
cupy the field of regulation of discrimination in employment and
housing encompassed by the provisions of this part, exclusive of all
declaring AIDS to be a physical handicap for the purpose of prohibiting discrimination.
Last year, [Assemblyman] Agnos twice introduced similar bills, but both were vetoed by the
governor.").
239. The power and duties of local goverment units are addressed in article 11 of the
California Constitution. Section 2(a) thereof authorizes the legislature to provide for the city
powers: "The Legislature shall prescribe uniform procedure for city formation and provide
for city powers." Article 11, section 7, applicable to counties and cities generally, authorizes
them to adopt ordinances not in conflict with state law: "A county or city may make and
enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not
in conflict with general laws." For cities in general, a "conflict" is deemed to exist not only
when an ordinance directly contradicts state law, but also when it duplicates state law.
Comment, Article 33 of the San Francisco Police Code: An Unconstitutional Exercise of
Municipal Authority, 17 U.S.F.L. REv. 525, 527 (1983) [hereinafter Article 33]. A conflict
also will exist if the city authorizes that which the state prohibits, or prohibits that which
the state authorizes. Id. at 527. However, California Constitution art. 11, section 5(a), pro-
vides in part that "city charters adopted pursuant to this Constitution shall supersede any
existing charter, and with respect to municipal affairs shall supersede all laws inconsistent
therewith." Also, it provides that cities operating under a charter may adopt ordinances of
local application regardless of whether it addresses a matter already addressed by the state
legislature. See Bishop v. City of San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d 56, 460 P.2d 137, 81 Cal. Rptr 465
(1969). See also DeYoung & Johnson, The Traffic Congestion Bottleneck: City Police
Power, Municipal Affairs and Tax Solutions, 10 U.C. DAvIs. L. REv. 207, 212 (1977); Alioto's
Fish Co. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 120 Cal. App. 3d 594, 603, 174 Cal. Rptr. 763 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 944 (1982); Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d 644, 704,
693 P.2d 261, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1984), aff'd, 475 U.S. 260 (1985) ("In addition, charter
cities have even greater authority; they have exclusive power to legislate over 'municipal
affairs.' "); Gates v. Municipal Court of Santa Clara County, San Jose Facility, 135 Cal. App.
3d 309, 317, 185 Cal. Rptr. 330, 334 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) ("If the subject matter or field of
the legislation has been fully occupied by the state, there is no room for supplementary or
complementary local legislation, even if the subject is otherwise one properly characterized
as a 'municipal affair.' "). But even the ordinances of charter cities will fall when (1) the
legislature occupies the field by full and complete regulations; (2) a subject matter which
has only been partially covered by state legislation is deemed to be of "paramount state
concern," or (3) a subject matter, only partially covered by state legislation, is of such na-
ture that a local ordinance will adversely affect the transient citizens of the state. Article 33,
supra, at 527.
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other laws banning discrimination in city, city and county, county
or other political subdivisions of the state."2 ' °
Indications that the California legislature intended to preempt
local housing and employment ordinances are buttressed by
Alioto's Fish Co. v. Human Rights Commission.4 Fourteen Fish-
erman's Wharf restaurants, that leased their premises from the
San Francisco Port Commission, challenged attempts by the Port
Commission to insert into their respective leases employment non-
discrimination provisions of the San Francisco Human Rights Or-
dinance and an affirmative action agreement. The court upheld the
leases as an exercise by the city of its power to insert nondiscrimi-
nation terms in a contract-its contracting power. However, in dic-
tum, the court stated that had the ordinance been an attempt to
exert municipal police power, it would have fallen afoul of the
law. 1 2 As one California labor law expert reviewing Alioto's said:
If the interpretation [in Alioto's of the FEHA Fair Employment
and Housing Act] remains valid, then the local ordinances prohib-
iting AIDS-based discrimination in employment will not stand.
Because, as seen above, it is virtually certain that discrimination
on the basis of AIDS will be found to be discrimination in viola-
tion of FEHA, and because it is hard to conceive of a basis for
these ordinances other than the local police power, they will likely
be found to be invalid municipal legislation in a field preempted
by the state.2 4 3
240. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(c) (West 1980). In 1963, an opinion of the California At-
torney General concluded that the California Fair Employment Practices Act and the Rum-
ford Fair Housing Act preempted the entire field of labor and housing discrimination and
that additional local regulation was precluded. 42 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 114 (1963). See also
60 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 44, 48 (1977). The Attorney General's opinion has been strengthened
by section 12993(c) of the Fair Employment and Housing Act.
241. 120 Cal. App. 3d 594, 174 Cal Rptr. 763 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
242. Aliotos, 120 Cal. App. 3d at 605-606, 174 Cal Rptr. at 768-69.
243. Jonas, AIDS and California Employment Law, 4 Lab. & Empl. Law News 5 (Win-
ter 1986) (official publication of the state bar of California Labor and Employment Law
Section) (on file, Florida State University Law Review). See also id. at 6 n.10 ("In its opin-
ion letter to Los Angeles City Council regarding the ordinance finally enacted there, the Los
Angeles City Attorney's office concluded on the basis of Alioto's that the employment provi-
sions of that city's ordinance are preempted by the FEHA."). Cf. Article 33, supra note 239
(indicating that the nondiscrimination provisions of Article 33 of the San Francisco Police
Code relating to race, religion, color, ancestry, age, sex, disability and sexual orientation are
invalid due to the legislative preemption of the field in the Fair Employment and Housing
Act of 1980). See also id. at 544 n.97 (quoting letter from Donald J. Garibaldi, Deputy City
Attorney, to Gilbert H. Boreman, Clerk of the Board (March 9, 1978), which "informed the
Board that the City Attorney's office was 'withholding . . . approval of (article 331 as to
legality' because 'there is no clear legal authority that a municipality is empowered to create
[private] rights or remedies .... ").
AIDS DISCRIMINATION
In addition to the direct evidence of preemption in the field of
employment and housing discrimination, there are indications that
California state court precedent would invalidate the local ordi-
nances barring AIDS-based discrimination.244 First, local ordi-
nances fall if the matter regulated is one of statewide concern. 4 5
Second, local ordinances fall if the matter regulated is one which
demands uniform regulation throughout the state.24 ' Third, local
ordinances fall because, "[w]hen there is a doubt, as to whether an
attempted regulation relates to a municipal or to a state matter, or
if it be the mixed concern of both, the doubt must be resolved in
favor of the legislative authority of the state. 241 7
Finally, and most significantly, there is substantial doubt as to
whether California cities have authority to create private rights in
favor of third parties. 4 8 In light of the fact that counsel advised
both the Los Angeles City Council and the San Francisco Board of
Supervisors of the dubious constitutionality of their respective
anti-AIDS discrimination ordinances, 49 these elected bodies either
concluded otherwise or adopted these ordinances for political expe-
diency. In addition to California, there are municipal home rule
244. Article 33, supra note 239, at 543-47.
245. Id. at 529-30.
246. Id. at 530-31.
247. Id. at 532 (quoting Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 681, 349 P.2d 974,
979 3 Cal. Rptr. 158, 163 (1960)).
248. Id. at 543-47.
249. Id. at 529-30.
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ordinances in Florida,25 ° New York,2 5' and New Jersey. 52 Those
250. In Florida, for example, cities and counties have broad powers to adopt local ordi-
nances. See FLA. CONST. art VIII, §§ 1(g), 2(b); FLA. STAT. § 166.011-411 (1985). Neverthe-
less, localities must be careful not to provide greater protection for people with AIDS-re-
lated disorders than is the case under state law. In City of Miami Beach v. Rocio Corp., 404
So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), review denied, 408 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 1981), for example, the
court enjoined a city from enforcing its ordinance regulating condominium conversions be-
cause it conflicted with the state Condominium Act. The state act forbade cancellation of
tenant leases upon less than 120 days notice, while the city ordinance forbade cancellation
of tenant leases upon less than 18 months notice. The court rejected the city's argument
that its ordinance merely supplemented tenant protection already in the state as "without
merit" because "[wihen conduct permitted by state law is prohibited by local ordinance,
citizens become hopelessly entangled in a web of government." Id. at 1071. Similarly, in
Edwards v. State, 422 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), a local ordinance that imposed penal-
ties for possession of varying amounts of illegal drugs was challenged. Although local ordi-
nances generally impose sanctions less severe than those imposed under state law, the court
invalidated the ordinance to the extent that it conflicted with state law by removing the
trial judge's discretion to withhold adjudication and order probation or participation in a
drug rehabilitation program for those convicted of possessing small amounts of illegal drugs.
Id. at 85-86.
Additionally, FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § l(g), allows charter counties to establish ordinances
of a regulatory nature. Consequently, advocates for people with AIDS-related disorders
must consider the possibility that municipal ordinances might clash with county regulations.
251. Article IX, section 2, of the New York [State] Constitution addresses, among other
matters, the home rule powers of local governments. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2. Among the
powers granted to localities is authorization to adopt ordinances for the "government, pro-
tection, order, conduct, safety, health and well-being of persons or property therein" not
inconsistent with the provisions of the state constitution or any general law relating to these
subjects. Id. at § 2(c)(ii)(10). These constitutional powers have been codified in article II,
section 10 of the Municipal Home Rule Law (McKinney 1969 & Supp. 1987). It provides
how ordinances may be adopted and how amendments to home rule charters may be en-
acted. Ordinances may be adopted by the legislative body of a locality by majority vote. Id.
at § 20(i).
In addition to direct inconsistencies between a local ordinance and a state statutory provi-
sion, localities must also exercise concern for legislative preemption. Preemption occurs
where the state has acted upon a subject such that it evidences a desire to exclude varying
local regulations. See People v. Cook, 34 N.Y.2d 100, 356 N.Y.S.2d 259, 312 N.E.2d 452
(1974). A potential preemption problem might exist between local remedies for discrimina-
tion suffered by people with AIDS-related disorders, and the state Human Rights Law
which among other matters, addresses discrimination on the basis of handicap. N.Y. ExEc. §
290-301 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1987). However, several opinions of the New York state
attorney general indicate that state legislation in this area is not intended to preempt local
laws on the subject. See, e.g., 1968 Op. N.Y. Atty. Gen. 98 (Aug. 1, 1968) (Legislation
prohibiting discrimination in housing practices has not been preempted by the state. Local
laws may be enacted provided they do not make illegal that which the state allows. The
validity of the local laws is not affected by the fact that greater penalties are thereby
imposed.).
The New York Commission on Human Rights already has extended that Act to include
people with an AIDS-related disorder. Pear, States' AIDS Discrimination Law Rejects Jus-
tice Department's Stand, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1986, at A20, col. 1. Accordingly, the poten-
tial for any sort of preemption problem is remote. Nevertheless, New York, either by legisla-
tive amendment or judicial fiat could declare that the Human Rights Law does not extend
so far as to include persons with AIDS related disorders. In this situation, the failure of the
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states combine to account for 75% of reported AIDS cases.253
IX. CONCLUSION
Although the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 remains the primary
federal statute to remedy discrimination suffered by recipients of
federal funds, ERISA and EAHCA may also be useful in appropri-
ate circumstances. Because the Rehabilitation Act applies only to
recipients of federal funds, and because it can at any time be
amended to exclude from its scope people with AIDS-related disor-
ders, it is necessary to consider alternative means of recovery
under state and local law.
Practically all states have statutes to protect the handicapped
from discrimination. These statutes should protect from discrimi-
legislature to extend protection to people with AIDS-related disorders would not preempt
localities from providing such protection. See 1978 Op. N.Y. Atty. Gen. 115 (March 6, 1978)
(Informal) (local legislation prohibiting discrimination in housing, employment and places
of public accommodation on the basis of sexual preference has not been preempted by the
state).
252. The New Jersey Constitution provides generally for the power of municipalities and
counties. N.J. CONST. art. 4, 11 (municipalities and counties have powers not only expressly
set forth in the constitution or laws of New Jersey, but also powers of fair or necessary
implication or incident thereto and are not inconsistent with or prohibited by the state
constitution or law). The powers of municipalities and counties has been expanded upon in
the state's statutes. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:48-1 - 29 (West 1967 & Supp. 1987).
New Jersey has a civil rights act entitled the Law Against Discrimination. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 10:5-1 -38 (West 1976 & Supp. 1986). Section 5-4.1 bans discrimination on the basis of
handicap. Since the New Jersey division on Civil Rights has held that people with AIDS-
related disorders are protected under the handicap discrimination ban, 2 Empl. Prac. Guide
(CCH) (Empl. Prac. Dec.) V 5026, it could be argued that this statute preempts local
ordinances.
A state statute will preempt a local ordinance where: (1) there is a conflict between the
two in underlying policy or operational effect; (2) the state was intended, implicitly or ex-
pressly, to be exclusive in the field; (3) the subject matter reflects a need for uniformity; (4)
the state regulatory scheme is so pervasive that it occupies the entire field. Overlook Terrace
Mgmt. Corp. v. Rent Control Bd., 71 N.J. 451, 366 A.2d 321 (1976). Since the Law Against
Discrimination contains no express statement of legislative intent to occupy the field, and
since § 10:5-10 of the Law Against Discrimination authorizes the mayor or chief executive
officer of a municipality to appoint a local commission on civil rights, and § 10:5-14.2 thereof
provides a mechanism under which local civil rights commissions are created, it is unlikely
that preemption exceptions (2), (3) or (4) are applicable. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-10,
10:5-14.2 (West 1976 & Supp. 1986). As a result of the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights'
administrative interpretation that the Law Against Discrimination extends to people with
AIDS-related disorders, local ordinances should be valid absent either a judicial determina-
tion or legislative amendment to the statute providing an administrative extension. Were
either of these events to occur, the local ordinance would be invalid because it would conflict
with the Law Against Discrimination.
253. Council Report: The Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 252 J.A.M.A. 2037,
2038 (Oct. 19, 1984).
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nation people with AIDS-related disorders. Some state civil rights
commissions have interpreted their respective civil rights laws to
protect victims of AIDS-related discrimination. However, only in a
few cases has the issue been litigated such that the agency's inter-
pretation could be approved judicially.
Local civil rights ordinances might be helpful, but it is often dif-
ficult to determine the extent of the validity of municipal power,
which is limited by state law. Notwithstanding the fact that the
California attorney general has issued two opinions stating that the
state legislature has preempted the field of discrimination in hous-
ing and employment, and notwithstanding similar opinions of
counsel for the cities of Los Angeles and San Fransisco, those two
cities and other cities in California have enacted ordinances to pro-
vide compensation, punitive damages and attorneys fees for people
who suffered AIDS-related discrimination. Accordingly, both the
ordinances and the laws of the specific state involved must be thor-
oughly reviewed before one pursues relief under a local ordinance.
Despite the problematic nature of state and municipal civil
rights laws, they must be used. The general trend among the states
is to apply an analysis similar to that set forth in this Article and
in Arline to evaluate AIDS-related discrimination claims on the
basis of scientific fact and medical knowledge. Since AIDS is com-
municated to others only through intimate sexual contact or the
transfer of blood products, it is expected that almost all discrimi-
nation against such people will be illegal.
